INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENTS, NATURAL DISASTERS AND “ACT OF
GOD”
Michael Faure, Liu Jing, and Andri G. Wibisana
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.

INTRODUCTION ............................................................................... 385

II.

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND ......................................................... 386
A. Act of God and Efficient Liability Rules ................................... 387
B. Act of God and the Scope of Liability....................................... 388
C. Foreseeability and Uncertainty Over Causation ..................... 390
D. Summary ................................................................................... 392

III.

ACT OF GOD IN U.S. LAW ............................................................... 393
A. Elements of an Act of God ........................................................ 395
1. An Act of God Should Be Grave ........................................ 395
2. The Act of God and Its Impacts Should be
Unforeseeable .................................................................... 397
3. The Act of God Should be the “Sole Cause” of Loss......... 402
4. The Act of God Defense Under Strict Liability? ................ 405
5. Causation, the Burden of Proof, and Apportionment ........ 410

IV.

NATURAL DISASTERS AND NUCLEAR ACCIDENTS ......................... 412
A. The First Generation Conventions ........................................... 413

Michael Faure is professor of Comparative and International Environmental Law at
Metro, Maastricht University, the Netherlands and professor of Comparative Private Law &
Economics at the Rotterdam Institute of Law and Economics (RILE), Erasmus School of Law,
Rotterdam, the Netherlands. At the time of writing this contribution, he was equally
haiwaimingshi (distinguished foreign professor) at the Center for Law and Economics, China
University of Political Science and Law (CUPL), Beijing, China.
Corresponding author Dr. Liu Jing is a postdoctoral researcher in Research Institute of
Environmental Law, School of Law, Center of Cooperative Innovation for Judicial
Civilization, Wuhan University, China and Behavioral Approach of Contract and Tort,
Erasmus University Rotterdam, the Netherlands. She defended her PhD thesis at Maastricht
University. She is grateful for the support of China Postdoctoral Science Foundation (Project
No. 14YJC820033) and the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences.
Dr. Andri Wibisana defended a PhD thesis at Maastricht University, the Netherlands and
is currently a lecturer at the Faculty of Law Universitas Indonesia in Jakarta, Indonesia.

383

384

GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.

[Vol. 43:383

B. New Developments ................................................................... 417
C. Nuclear Liability and Act of God Defense in the U.S............... 419
D. Summary ................................................................................... 425
V.

CASES .............................................................................................. 427
A. Lapindo Mudflow Case: A Critical Perspective....................... 427
1. Court Ruling on the Mudflow Disaster .............................. 430
a. Introduction to Walhi v. Lapindo ................................ 431
b. Court’s Ruling: Earthquake Triggered the
Mudflow....................................................................... 433
2. Critical Notes on the Court’s Ruling in Walhi v.
Lapindo .............................................................................. 435
B. Fukushima: Act of God?........................................................... 442
1. The Factual Background ................................................... 442
2. Legal Framework of Nuclear Liability in Japan ............... 443
3. Compensation for the Fukushima Accident in Practice..... 447

VI.

CONCLUDING REMARKS ................................................................. 449

2015]

“ACT OF GOD”

385

I. INTRODUCTION
Disasters befall developing and developed countries alike.1 Scholars have
long grappled with questions of how disasters can be prevented and
governed, and how victims of disasters can be compensated.2
Traditionally, a distinction is made between technological disasters and
natural disasters. This distinction is founded in logic; as tort law can easily
be applied to man-made technological disasters because a tortfeasor can be
identified and held liable. It is much more difficult to identify a tortfeasor
responsible for natural disasters because they are said to be caused by force
majeure, an “Act of God.” Consequently, natural disasters are seemingly
excluded from the realm of tort law.
However, this distinction between technological disasters and natural
ones is not so simple. Nature may cause a disaster, but the scope of the
damage can be exacerbated by human mistakes. For example, constructing
residences in a flood plain or failing to take preventive measures to minimize
the harm caused by natural disasters largely increases the magnitude of the
resulting damage. Preventive measures like structurally changing river
shapes to provide additional buffer basin to mitigate flooding damage and
employing building techniques to reduce the impact of an earthquake on
dwellings3 highlight that governments, not individuals, have the capacity to
take these overarching preventive measures.4 Consequently, liability for the
consequences of a natural disaster may be imposed on the government.
The increased occurrence and magnitude of natural disasters caused by
climate change exemplify the point that man’s actions play a role in causing

1

The losses due to disasters have increased considerably over the last decades. See, e.g.,
Laurens M. Bouwer, Have Disaster Losses Increased Due to Anthropogenic Climate
Change?, 92 BULL. AM. METEOR. SOC’Y 39, 43 (2011) (discussing increased economic losses
resulting from climate change-influenced disasters).
2
See, e.g., VÉRONIQUE BRUGGEMAN, COMPENSATING CATASTROPHE VICTIMS: A
COMPARATIVE LAW AND ECONOMICS APPROACH (2010); see also FINANCIAL COMPENSATION
FOR VICTIMS OF CATASTROPHES: A COMPARATIVE LAW AND ECONOMICS APPROACH (Michael
Faure & Ton Harlief eds., 2006); see generally ON RISK AND DISASTER: LESSONS FROM
HURRICANE KATRINA (Ronald J. Daniels, Donald F. Kettle & Howard Kunreuther eds., 2006).
3
See, e.g., T. Imai, Earthquake Insurance on Dwelling Risks in Japan, in ASIAN
CATASTROPHE INSURANCE 59–77 (C.H. Scawthorn & K. Kobayashi eds., 2008).
4
See Michael Faure, Towards Effective Compensation for Victims of Natural Catastrophes
in Developing Countries, in REGULATING DISASTERS, CLIMATE CHANGE AND ENVIRONMENTAL
HARM: LESSONS FROM THE INDONESIAN EXPERIENCE 243–45 (Michael Faure & Andri
Wibisana eds., 2013).
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the resulting damage.5 Even though liability rules in climate change cases
cannot be neatly applied, scholars increasingly debate and consider the
possibility of imposing such liability.6
This Article will focus on distributing liability for industrial accidents
triggered by natural disasters like the incident at Japan’s Fukushima nuclear
reactor, which resulted from a March 11, 2011 tsunami. While natural
disasters are generally excluded from tort liability, excluding industrial
operators from liability altogether when an industrial accident was triggered
by a natural disaster may be too easy of a solution if the damage could have
been mitigated by preventive measures that were not taken. The Fukushima
case is illustrative in this respect. There, the nuclear reactor meltdown
occurred primarily because both the original and the reserve generators for
the cooling system were placed at a low level in the nuclear power plant
which was located in an area vulnerable to earthquakes and tsunamis.
Consequently, the nuclear reactors were vulnerable to flooding.7 Should the
entity responsible for the power plant’s faulty design and operation be
excluded from liability simply because a force majeure triggered the natural
disaster?
We will address this question by first providing a few theoretical
observations based on economic analysis of the deterrent function of liability
rules. Next, we will discuss United States case law concerning natural
disasters, force majeure, and the way natural disasters and force majeure are
treated in cases involving nuclear accidents. We will then examine two
exemplary Asian cases: the Indonesian mudflow highlighting the difficulties
in distinguishing between technological and natural disasters, and Fukushima
highlighting how technological flaws and natural disasters together caused
the damage.
II. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
The economic analysis of accident law is helpful in assessing whether
liability should stem from an industrial accident caused by a natural disaster
5
See Richard Zeckhauser, The Economics of Catastrophes, 12 J. RISK UNCERTAINTY 134
(1996).
6
See on this issue inter alia the contributions in CLIMATE CHANGE LIABILITY (Michael
Faure & Marjan Peeters eds., 2011).
7
See J. Mark Ramseyer, Why Power Companies Build Nuclear Reactors on Fault Lines:
The Case of Japan, 13 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAW 457 (2011); see also Michael Faure &
Jing Liu, The Tsunami of March 2011 and the Subsequent Nuclear Incident at Fukushima:
Who Compensates the Victims, 37 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 129, 202–03 (2012).
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because it posits that liability exposure will provide operators incentives to
take preventive measures.8 Potential liability would cause operators to weigh
cost and benefits and ultimately adopt optimal care and activity levels.9
A. Act of God and Efficient Liability Rules
The Latin maxim actus dei nemini facit injuriam stands for the common
principle that the law should hold no man responsible for the Act of God.10
The law and economics scholarship generally supports this principle. For
example, Landes and Posner argue that holding one liable for the damage
resulting from an Act of God will not result in allocative gains, since liability
cannot deter a similar damage in the future.11 Standard tort law economic
analysis considers the goal of tort law to be minimizing the expected social
costs of accident ܧሺܵܥሻ, where ܧሺܵܥሻ is the sum of cost of care, wx , plus the
expected harm which depends on the level of care, ሺݔሻܣ. Following Cooter
and Ulen, the expected social costs of an accident is denoted as:12
ܧሺܵܥሻ ൌ  ݔݓ ሺݔሻ ܣǥ ሺሺͳሻሻ

The optimal level of care,  כ ݔ, is a level of care that minimizes the
expected costs of accident, ܧሺܵܥሻ. Where the level of care is optimal, the
marginal cost of care will equal the reduction of expected harm, that is:
 ݓൌ  െଵ ( כ ݔሻ ܣǥ ሺሺʹሻሻ

It follows from (1) and (2) that both the negligence rule and strict liability
will induce the injurer to take the optimal level of care. Under the
negligence rule, the injurer will choose  כ ݔsince, by taking this level of care,
she will avoid being held liable for the harm, A. Under strict liability, the
injurer will take  כ ݔsince this level of care will result in the least expected
costs of accident ܧሺܵܥሻ.13

8

This has been developed by Steven Shavell among others. See, e.g., STEVEN SHAVELL,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 297–98 (1987).
9
Steven Shavell, Strict Liability Versus Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1980).
10
C.G. Hall, An Unsearchable Providence: The Lawyer’s Concept of Act of God, 13
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 227, 229 (1993).
11
William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Causation in Tort Law: An Economic
Approach, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 109, 117 (1983).
12
ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 200–01 (6th ed. 2012).
13
Id. at 203–07.
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Although both the negligence rule and strict liability can induce the
injurer to take the optimal level of care, they are different in their impacts on
the optimal level of activity. Since under the negligence rule the injurer will
not be liable so long as he takes the optimal level of care, he will not have
incentives to reduce his activity level up to the optimal level (or to take the
optimal level of activity). In contrast, since strict liability will hold the
injurer liable anytime the damage occurs, the injurer will also take the
optimal level of activity in order to reduce the chance of accident and being
held liable.14
The presence of a possible Act of God changes (1). When the court
accepts the defense of an Act of God, the probability of an accident depends
solely on the Act of God, and does not depend on the injurer’s negligence.
Hence, this situation basically shows that the change in the probability of
accident with respect to the change in the injurer’s level of care is zero.15
Since the marginal cost of care equals the reduction of expected harm
resulting from the change in the injurer’s level of care, one could conclude
that holding the injurer liable for an accident arising from his negligence is
enough to induce him to take the optimal level of care.16 In this situation, as
long as the cost of taking the optimal level of care is less than the expected
liability, the injurer will be induced to take the optimal level of care in order
to avoid liability.
In addition, it could also be concluded that similar incentives to take the
optimal level of care will also apply under strict liability. When the defense
of an Act of God is accepted, the injurer will be liable for the damage
resulting only from his activity. Thus, he will take the optimal level of care,
since this is the level that minimizes total expected costs.
B. Act of God and the Scope of Liability
The question arises, of course, whether and under what conditions the
court will accept the Act of God defense, and hence interpret that the change
in the probability of accident with respect to the change in the injurer’s level
of care is zero. Such a question corresponds to the issue of what has been
termed as the scope of liability. Ben-Shahar considers the scope of liability
as a causation restriction, consisting of a set of circumstances where liability

14
15
16

Id. at 212.
See Landes & Posner, supra note 11, at 114.
Id.
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applies. Accordingly, the scope of liability determines that an injurer is
liable when his level of care is a necessary cause of harm; his level of care is
a necessary cause if a different level of care would have led to another level
of harm. The scope of liability is considered restricted if there are
circumstances under which the injurer is not liable despite the presence of
some harms. In contrast, the scope of liability is unrestricted if the injurer
will always be liable any time harm occurs, regardless of the circumstances
surrounding the harm.17
It is likely that the scope of liability is set at the optimal level, whereby
the injurer is liable only for the harm arising from his act (or his lack of care
under the negligence rule). Under an optimal scope of liability, the injurer is
not liable for harm that was not caused by his act, namely when the change
of injurer’s care did not alter the probability of harm. However, it is likely
that the scope of liability is inefficiently unrestricted such that the injurer is
held liable although his level of care did not alter the probability of harm. In
contrast, it is also likely that the injurer is not liable although his act did
change the expected harm. This is a situation of an inefficiently restricted
scope of liability, where the injurer is not held liable although the change in
the injurer’s level of care might also contribute to the accident given the
presence of an Act of God.
Law and economics scholarship indicates that these sets of liability scope
each give rise to different incentives for the injurer to take the optimal levels
of care and activity. For example, under the negligence rule, the unrestricted
scope of liability might lead to increased administrative costs associated with
the use of lawsuits, but the injurer will still be induced to take the optimal
level of care. In this case, “imposing liability for negligence where care
would not have avoided the accident could produce an inefficient reduction
in the injurer’s activity level.”18 However, if the scope of liability is too
17
Omri Ben-Shahar, Causation and Foreseeability, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECON.
644, 644–49 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000) [hereinafter Ben-Shahar,
Causation and Foreseeability, 2000]. See also Omri Ben-Shahar, Causation and Foreseeability,
in TORT LAW AND ECONOMICS 83, 87 (Michael Faure ed., 2009) [hereinafter Ben-Shahar,
Causation and Foreseeability, 2009]. According to Shavell, the scope of liability can be
restricted by following the “cause-in-fact” principle, i.e., the test indicating that harm would not
have occurred but for the injurer’s act. In addition, the scope of liability can also be restricted for
some other grounds, e.g., that the injurer’s act was not the “proximate cause” of the harm, that
after the injurer’s act there was an “unforeseeable intervening cause,” or that the harm was a
freak occurrence. See Steven Shavell, An Analysis of Causation and the Scope of Liability in the
Law of Torts, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 463, 463–64 (1980). Landes & Posner, supra note 11, at 118.
18
Landes & Posner, supra note 11, at 118.
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restricted, the injurer will not have incentives to take the optimal level of
care or to reduce his level of activity.19
Under strict liability, an unrestricted scope of liability will induce the
injurer to take the optimal level of care as he can be held liable for any harm.
In addition, since he will be liable for any harm, the injurer will significantly
reduce the level of activity and will perhaps withdraw from activity. If the
injurer’s engagement in his activity is socially desirable, strict liability
presents a serious problem. People may withdraw from socially beneficial
activities in order to avoid liability. Such an unfortunate situation, resulting
from what is called by Shavell as “crushing liability,”20 is to be avoided by
restricting liability. The problem is, however, inefficiently restricting the
scope of liability will lessen the incentives to take the optimal level of care
meaning fewer incentives to take care in preventing harm.21
The above discussions on the scope of liability are crucial for the analysis
of the Act of God defense. Defined too broadly, the use of the Act of God
defense significantly limits the scope of liability and the injurer might have
fewer incentives to take the optimal level of care. Defined too narrowly, the
defense may inefficiently broaden the scope of liability, which could
eventually lead to a less than optimal level of activity. But this disadvantage
may be outweighed by the advantages.
C. Foreseeability and Uncertainty Over Causation
An Act of God could be seen as an unforeseeable factor which intervenes
in the injurer’s act. In this regard, the injurer should not be held liable for
harm resulting from an event that is considered unlikely to occur. Indeed,
one cannot be required to prevent a harm of which the probability is zero.
Hence, liability for this type of harm will not induce the injurer to take
optimal precaution ex ante.
An important question in determining whether an event is unforeseeable
is which type of probability should be taken into account. Shavell defines
unforeseeability as an event of which the probability has been
underestimated by the injurer. In this regard, Shavell argues that the
inclusion of an accident overlooked by the injurer in the scope of liability
will not have any effect on the injurer’s behavior since this behavior will be

19
20
21

Shavell, supra note 17, at 487–88.
Id. at 465.
Id. at 484.
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dependent on the injurer’s subjective probability.22 However, as Shavell also
indicates, the foreseeability test for liability might reduce the incentives for
the injurer to carefully take into account the potential impacts of his action.23
One could also find that employing subjective probability in determining
the unforeseeability might lead to a situation where the injurer’s subjective
probability is systematically lower than that of the court or a reasonable man.
In this situation, the injurer may potentially argue that he could not have
foreseen the occurring harm, although similar harm had once occurred or it
was within the risks of the injurer’s activity. If the injurer is allowed to use
such an argument in order to establish the unforeseeability of harm, one
could expect that this will significantly reduce the injurer’s incentive to
anticipate and prevent the harm that, in the court’s opinion, should have been
foreseen.
Finally, the Act of God defense might also correspond to the issue of
uncertainty over causation. In this regard, two familiar approaches in
addressing the uncertainty are the all-or-nothing and the proportional liability
approaches. Under the all-or-nothing approach, the injurer will be held liable
for all harm once it is established that the probability that the injurer’s act
caused the harm exceeds the probability threshold, usually the preponderance
of the evidence rule.24 In contrast, under the proportional liability approach,
the injurer’s liability is proportional to the probability that his act is the cause
of the harm.25 Shavell argues that the proportional liability approach is
superior to the all-or-nothing approach because proportional liability induces
the injurer to take both socially optimal levels of care and activity if strict
liability is applied and leads to the optimal level of care if the negligence rule
is applied. These results do not hold for the all-or-nothing approach.26 The
issue of uncertainty over causation is of high importance in determining

22
Id. at 490. Shavell also describes some findings in behavioral economics indicating that
people tend to underestimate the probability of an event that is hard to imagine or not
memorable. Id. at 491.
23
Id. at 492. Similarly, Ben-Shahar argues that including unforeseen harms in the scope of
liability might have the positive impact of inducing the injurer to find out information about
the consequences of this action. See Ben-Shahar, Cause and Foreseeability, 2009, supra note
17, at 101.
24
Neil Orloff & Jery Stedinger, A Framework for Evaluating the Preponderance-of-theEvidence Standard, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 1159 (1983).
25
Ben-Shahar, Causation and Foreseeability, 2000, supra note 17, at 652–53.
26
Steven Shavell, Uncertainty over Causation and the Determination of Civil Liability, 28
J.L. & ECON. 587, 596–99 (1985).
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liability where an Act of God comingled with the injurer’s act resulted in the
victim’s harm.
D. Summary
The above overview highlights the fact that there is no easy,
straightforward answer as to how the Act of God defense should be treated,
especially when it is triggering an industrial accident. The Act of God is not
in the injurer’s scope of control, but the industrial accident may be within the
injurer’s scope of control. The difficulty in determining the proper scope of
liability in such a case lies in determining what it means that the natural
disaster “caused” the industrial accident. The crucial question then becomes:
Notwithstanding the Act of God (like a natural disaster), could the operator
have taken efficient measures either to prevent the occurrence of the incident
or limit the scope of the harm? If the answer to the question is yes,
excluding liability of the operator simply because the incident was related to
an Act of God would clearly be inefficient. From this, other pertinent
questions arise, such as whether a natural disaster is unforeseeable or within
the scope of causal uncertainty, and to what extent the harm was caused by
the natural disaster itself, the operator’s negligence, or both.
Notwithstanding the nuances of the presented economic analysis, it is
clear that exposing an operator to liability for harm which he could not
reasonably have prevented (since the event was caused by a natural disaster–
an Act of God) would clearly be inefficient. Such liability exposure would
not increase prevention incentives because the event would be totally
unforeseeable. Exposure to liability would only deter economic efficient
activity. However, excluding liability of the operator just because the event
was triggered by a natural disaster would lead to under deterrence to the
extent that the operator could have foreseen the natural disaster (e.g., because
his facility was built in an earthquake or flood prone area) and could thus
have taken efficient preventive measures to reduce the probability of the
incident occurring or the magnitude of the harm. Therefore, determining to
what extent the industrial incident triggered by a natural disaster was
foreseeable and to what extent the harm could have been prevented is crucial.
If the operator could foresee the natural disaster and the lack of preventative
measures by the operator caused the accident, imposing liability is
reasonable. If, however, the operator’s negligence in not taking sufficient
preventive measures only contributed to the probability of the accident or to
an increase in the magnitude of the harm, then magnitude of this proportion
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should be assessed. In that case, like with uncertainty over causation, a
proportional liability approach could be applied.
The extent to which it is merely the natural disaster, the operator’s failure
to foresee the disaster and take appropriate preventive measures, or a
combination of both is of course a factual and technical matter. Therefore,
we will now turn to the case law in the United States, showing how courts
have dealt with these questions.
III. ACT OF GOD IN U.S. LAW
In cases involving a natural cause defenses, all courts are faced with
difficulties in deciding the case amidst scientific and technical debates
concerning the true causes of harm. Unfortunately, some courts may also
have difficulties finding accepted authority regarding the use of natural cause
as a defense. In Indonesia, for example, there are no Indonesian textbooks or
scientific articles on tort law that specifically discuss the meaning of a
natural cause from a legal perspective. This is, however, not the case in the
United States. There are various discussions on the natural cause, or Act of
God, defense.27
Rulings of U.S. courts show the application of principled rules usually
requires the party invoking the Act of God defense to prove some elements
of the defense. These elements will be discussed below.
In defining an Act of God, some U.S. courts have emphasized the
exceptional character of a disaster in being unpreventable and unavoidable.
For example, in Apex Oil Company, Inc. v. United States the court defined an
Act of God as “unanticipated grave natural disaster or other natural
phenomenon of an exceptional, inevitable, and irresistible character the
effects of which could not have been prevented or avoided by the exercise of
due care or foresight.”28 The court referred to the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA),
stating that whether or not the Act of God defense will be accepted depends
27

In fact, one can find an article on the use of the Act of God defense, which was published
as early as 1883. In that article, Murfree, Sr. contrasts the Act of God with that of humans.
The author argues that the Act of God is “something in opposition to the act of man; for
everything is the Act of God that happens by His permission; everything by His knowledge.”
W.L. Murfree, Sr., The Act of God, 16 CENT. L.J. 182, 182 (1883). The author also notes that
in the case invoking the Act of God defense, the defendant bears the burden to prove not only
that the damage was caused by an Act of God, but also that there was no possibility to prevent
the loss, and no defendants’ negligence contributed to the realization of the loss. Id. at 184.
28
208 F. Supp. 2d 642, 645 (E.D. La. 2002).
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on the evidence of whether the disaster is exceptional, inevitable, and
irresistible in nature.29
Other rulings emphasize the absence of human intervention and
reasonable capacity to foresee or prevent the disaster. In Joseph Resnick, Co.
v. Kaisha, the court referred to the definition of the natural disaster given by
Black’s Law Dictionary, which defines a natural disaster as:
Any misadventure or casualty is said to be caused by the “Act
of God” when it happens by the direct, immediate, and
exclusive operation of the forces of nature, uncontrolled or
uninfluenced by the power of man and without human
intervention, and is of such a character that it could not have
been prevented or escaped from by any amount of foresight or
prudence, or by any reasonable degree of care or diligence, or
by the aid of any appliances which the situation of the party
might reasonably require him to use.30
Another definition of a natural disaster is given by the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court in Carlson v. Corrugated Box Corp. In this case, the court
interpreted a natural disaster as “an unusual, extraordinary, sudden, and
unexpected manifestation of the forces of nature which cannot be prevented
by human care, skill or foresight.”31
Finally, the Kansas Supreme Court in McFeeters v. Renollet formulated a
natural disaster as “an irresistible superhuman cause such as no reasonable
human foresight, prudence, diligence and care can anticipate and prevent;
29

The court stated that:
The defense for the exceptional natural phenomenon is similar to, but more
limited in scope than, the traditional ‘Act of God’ defense. It has three
elements: the natural phenomenon must be exceptional, inevitable, and
irresistible. Proof of all three elements is required for successful assertion of
the defense. The ‘Act of God’ defense is more nebulous, and many
occurrences asserted as ‘acts of God’ would not qualify as ‘exceptional
natural phenomenon.’
For example, a major hurricane may be an Act of God, but in an area (and at a time)
where a hurricane should not be unexpected, it would not qualify as a “phenomenon
of exceptional character.” Id. at 653.
30
241 N.Y.S.2d 134, 136. A similar definition can also be found in other rulings, such as
Butts v. City of South Fulton, 565 S.W.2d 879 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1977); McWilliams v. Masterson,
112 S.W.3d 314 (Tex. App. 2003); Sky Aviation Corp. v. Colt, 475 P.2d 301 (Wyo. 1970); and
Utilities Pipeline Co. v. Am. Petrofina Mktg., 760 S.W.2d 719 (Tex. App. 1988).
31
72 A.2d 290, 291 (Pa. 1950).
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and to be a defense must be an intervening cause which was not foreseeable
and the consequences of which could not be prevented.”32
Based on the definitions above, in order to be qualified as a defense to
escape liability, an Act of God should meet the requirements of being grave,
unforeseeable, and free from human intervention.33 These requirements will
be elaborated in the following sections.
A. Elements of an Act of God
1. An Act of God Should Be Grave
Generally, courts require an Act of God to be grave or severe in
magnitude. This held true in Sabine Towing & Transportation Co. v. United
States, where the party invoking the defense was required to demonstrate that
the Act of God was of great magnitude.34 The court, in rejecting the
32

500 P.2d 47, 48 (Kan. 1972).
One must note that other commentators might observe more or less requirements in
examining the Act of God defense. For example, Rundall has proposed a two-tier test for the
Act of God defense. In the first tier, the defendant must prove that an event claimed as an Act
of God can indeed be qualified as an Act of God. Once the act is qualified as an Act of God,
the second test takes place. In this test, the defendant has the burden to prove that the Act of
God is the sole proximate cause of the plaintiff’s loss. See Marsha T. Rundall, “Act of God”
as a Defense in Negligence Cases, 25 DRAKE L. REV. 754, 761–62 (1976). However, it could
also be argued that the first tier test is indeed the test to show that the claimed Act of God is
both grave in magnitude and unforeseeable. Other commentators even observe four
requirements in examining the Act of God defense, namely: first, that the event was a grave
natural phenomenon of an exceptional, inevitable, and irresistible character; second, whether
the event was anticipated; third, whether the event was the sole cause; and fourth, whether the
consequences of the event could have been prevented by due care or foresight. See Joel
Eagle, Divine Intervention: Re-Examining the “Act of God” Defense in a Post-Katrina World,
82 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 459, 476–87 (2007); see also Casey P. Kaplan, The Act of God
Defense: Why Hurricane Katrina and Noah’s Flood Don’t Qualify, 26 REV. LITIG. 155, 175–
76 (2007). It should be noted here that the examination of whether the claimed Act of God is
unforeseeable also includes the discussion about the foreseeability of its consequences, and,
hence, also includes the fourth requirement under the four requirements above.
34
Ralph M. Sugg, Blame It on the Rain? El Niño is No Excuse to Pollute, 21 WHITTIER L.
REV. 737, 752 (2000). In Sabine Towing & Transp., Co. v. United States, the Sabine Towing
filed a lawsuit against the U.S. Government. The plaintiff challenged the Government
decision requiring the plaintiff to conduct a cleanup for oil spills from the plaintiff’s vessel
which ruptured after striking unknown objects in the Hudson River. When the vessel was
moving in the Hudson River, there was a freshet condition in the River, as a result of spring
runoff of melted snow, which apparently not only increased the level of the River, but also
brought sediment, gravel, logs, rocks and other debris. The vessel inadvertently hit unknown
objects in the River, which then ruptured the vessel’s hull and tank. The cleaning cost the
33
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plaintiff’s Act of God defense, declined to categorize both spring runoff of
melted snow and the unknown objects that ruptured the ship’s hull as a
natural disaster.35 Eagle observes that the key to passing the test of gravity
for an Act of God defense is to show that an event was not only much more
grave and exceptional compared to other past Act of God cases, but one of
the most exceptional character.36 In this regard, one may see that the element
of gravity could be seen only in comparison with other similar events, in
which the claimed Act of God must be exceptional compared to other Act of
God events. The California Supreme Court in Southern Pac. Co. v. City of
Los Angeles confirmed this position by refusing to qualify rainstorms as a
defense. According to the Court, rainfall with the above-normal intensity
was not a natural disaster within the context of the Act of God defense. The
court stated “that a rainstorm which is merely of unusual intensity is not a
‘superhuman’ cause or Act of God, superseding the original negligence as
the proximate cause of the injury.”37 This opinion is also expressed in
United States v. Stringfellow,38 where the court ruled that “rains were not the
kind of ‘exceptional’ natural phenomena to which the narrow Act of God
defense of section 107(b)(1) applies.”39 The importance of these rulings is
that the courts usually associate a natural event with the time and place
where the event took place, such that if the event was common to that
particular time and place, the courts would refuse to consider the event as
unanticipated, and would hence, refuse the Act of God defense.

plaintiff incurred $113,943.41. Sabine Towing & Transp., Co. v. United States, 666 F.2d 561,
562–63 (Ct. Cl. 1981).
35
Sabine Towing & Transp., Co., 666 F.2d at 565.
36
Eagle, supra note 33, at 479.
37
55 P.2d 847, 849 (Cal. 1936).
38
661 F. Supp. 1053 (C.D. Cal. 1987). In this case, the plaintiff, the U.S. Government and
the Government of California, asked the defendants, namely a company producing, treating,
and transporting hazardous wastes, to reimburse the cost incurred by the plaintiff to conduct
clean-up and recovery from hazardous waste pollution. The defendants argued that the
pollution occurred due to heavy rains.
39
Id. at 1061; see also Radburn v. Fir Tree Lumber, Co., 145 P. 632, 633 (Wash. 1915)
(rejecting an Act of God defense based on heavy rainfalls that apparently exceeded the
Government’s official record of rainfall in the past thirteen years). With respect to the record
of heavy rains, the North Dakota Supreme Court in Frank v. County of Mercer considered as
an Act of God a rainfall of more than twice the maximum that would be expected to occur
once in a hundred years a natural disaster. The rainfall of this level is considered so
unprecedented and extraordinary that it fell within the Act of God defense. 186 N.W.2d 439
(N.D. 1971).
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It should also be noted here that a large number of court rulings explain
the grave and exceptional characters of a natural disaster by referring to the
question of whether the natural event was so unprecedented, unforeseeable,
and unanticipated, that it was unpreventable or unavoidable. Therefore, the
actual discussion about the gravity of a natural disaster will eventually
correspond to the ability to foresee the occurrence of a natural disaster, and
accordingly, to prevent the disaster or to minimize the impacts if it
nevertheless occurs. In this way, although one might have satisfied the
courts in showing that the claimed Act of God event was grave, one still has
to show that the event was unforeseeable.
2. The Act of God and Its Impacts Should be Unforeseeable
The second element of an Act of God, i.e., the element of unforeseeablity,
was used by a South Carolina court to define an Act of God as an accident
resulting from natural causes, impossible to be foreseen, and therefore
impossible to be guarded against.40
Unforeseeability is usually established by showing that the event is
unprecedented in a particular area.41 Some courts interpret the term
“unprecedented” in such a way that if a similar event has occurred any time
before the particular event, the event will be considered foreseeable, and
hence, the Act of God defense will fail to past the test.42 Other courts
conclude that to qualify as an Act of God in a legal sense, an event must not
only be unusual, but also be so unprecedented that its impacts could not be
anticipated nor prevented.43
When appraising the element of unforeseeability, courts usually pay a
great deal of attention to the characteristics of time and place. In Sky
Aviation Corp. v. Colt, the Wyoming Supreme Court rejected categorizing
wind as a natural disaster reasoning that “[t]he ordinary force of nature such
as winds which are usual at the time and place are conditions which
reasonably could have been anticipated and will not relieve from liability the
person guilty of the original negligent act.”44 One commentator concludes
that in seeing whether an event could have been anticipated or not, courts
40

Bill B. Bozeman, Note, Act of God, 4 S.C. L. Q. 421, 421 (1951).
James Lewis Howe III, Act of God: A Reconsideration, 18 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 336,
337 (1961).
42
Id.
43
Id. at 339.
44
475 P.2d 301, 304 (Wyo. 1970).
41
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will take into account the character of the area, the surrounding
circumstances, and the history of previous similar events in the area where
the event took place.45
Courts will also assess whether similar natural events have occurred prior
to the event in question in examining unforeseeability in an Act of God.
Hence, a natural event could be qualified as an Act of God if it was
unprecedented. In State v. Malone, the Texas Court of Appeals explicitly
made a distinction between the definition of unprecedented on the one hand,
and the definition of unusual or extraordinary on the other hand. In this case,
the court held that the term “unprecedented” means there is no previous
example or a new incident, while the term “unusual” or “extraordinary”
implies that a similar event has occurred, although rarely or infrequently.46
More importantly, a court might also be of the opinion that a natural
disaster, which has occurred in the past, should be seen as something that
could recur in the future. In this way, the disaster is considered foreseeable,
despite the fact that it might be extraordinary in nature. In this context, the
Nebraska Supreme Court, in Fairbury Brick, Co. v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry.
Co., stressed that:
The mere fact that a flood is extraordinary is not sufficient to
absolve the defendant from liability. Although a rainfall may
be more than ordinary, yet if it be such as has occasionally
occurred at irregular intervals, it is to be foreseen that it may
occur again; and a party engaged in a public work, the
construction of which involves the change or restraint of the
flow of water in a natural channel, is guilty of negligence if it
fails to make reasonable provision for the consequences that
will result from such extraordinary rainfalls as experience
shows are likely to recur.47
Furthermore, in examining whether a natural event could be considered
unprecedented, some courts look into the ability to anticipate or foresee the
45

Rundall, supra note 33, at 755.
The court stated: “ ‘Unprecedented’ means ‘having no precedent or example; novel, new,
unexampled’ ” while the terms “ ‘Unusual’ and ‘extraordinary’ . . . presuppose other like
occurrences, though rare or infrequent.” State v. Malone, 168 S.W.2d 292, 300 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1943).
47
113 N.W. 535, 537 (Neb. 1907); see Webb v. Platte Valley Pub. Power & Irrigation Dist.,
18 N.W.2d 563, 568 (Neb. 1945); State v. Malone, 168 S.W.2d 292, 300 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943).
46

2015]

“ACT OF GOD”

399

natural phenomenon and to avoid the resulting impacts. In this regard, the
Missouri Supreme Court, in Kennedy v. Union Electric, Co. of Missouri, held
that “[t]he term ‘Act of God’, in its legal sense, applies only to events in
nature so extraordinary that the history of climatic variations and other
conditions in the particular locality afford no reasonable warning of them.”48
Accordingly, one might conclude that information on local conditions and
past records of natural disaster should enable the parties to anticipate the
recurrence of the disaster. Therefore, a natural disaster that has occurred in
the past or is considered common should be seen as a foreseeable disaster, no
matter how large the impact might be. If the court thinks that such a natural
event is foreseeable, in the terms of its occurrence and possible impacts, the
Act of God defense is very likely to be dismissed. The California Supreme
Court in Southern Pac. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, clearly expressed this
position when it stated:
There is nothing in the nature of the rainstorm involved in this
case which makes it so totally unforeseeable as to act as a
superseding cause. It was simply a heavy rain, commencing
and continuing for several days, and perhaps it established a
record for volume in inches in that region. But it cannot be
concluded from this fact that the cause was wholly
unforeseeable. Rainfall is foreseeable in most places, and
heavy rainfall was characteristic of that region. There is no
point at which an expectable heavy rain becomes an act of God
by reason of its unusual volume.49
The rules concerning the Act of God defense can be categorized as the
rules regarding intervening causes.50 To qualify as an Act of God in a legal
sense, an event should be an unforeseeable intervening cause of which
consequences could not be prevented. In this regard, the defendant is liable
for both foreseeable results of foreseeable causes and for foreseeable results
of unforeseeable causes.51
It is important to note that the test of unforeseeability is carried out by
referring to objective standards, in the sense that the defendant should be
48

216 S.W.2d 756, 763 (Mo. 1948).
55 P.2d 847, 849 (Cal. 1936).
50
Denis Binder, Act of God? Or Act of Man?: A Reappraisal of the Act of God Defense in
Tort Law, 15 REV. LITIG. 1, 27 (1996).
51
Id.
49
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able to show that the event and its consequences cannot be foreseen,
anticipated, or prevented by a reasonable person. In this regard, Binder
argues that the test is about “what a reasonable person under similar
circumstances knew, or reasonably should have known,” and not about
“what a defendant thought.”52 In this sense, if an abnormal situation is
foreseeable, then taking normal precaution is not enough to prove that a
defendant has taken preventive measures to avoid the natural event and its
consequences.53 In Phillips v. United States, the court held that the
unforeseeability concept is flexible: If the danger is high and prevention
relatively simple, the level of foreseeability is considered high; whereas if
the level of danger is low and the prevention is considered difficult, the level
of foreseeability is considered low.54 In other words, it can be argued that
when the danger is seen to be high and the prevention is simple, everyone
should increasingly be able to predict the danger and to take the necessary
preventive measures. The court further stated that foreseeability is
determined not only on the grounds of whether a future harm is more
probable than not, but also “whatever result is likely enough in the setting of
modern life that a reasonable prudent person would take such into account in
guiding reasonable conduct.”55
It should be noted here that the majority of cases observed by
commentators somehow correspond only to certain types of natural events,
namely heavy rains, storms, hurricane, floods, or heavy snow. None of these
cases actually correspond to earthquakes. Thus, it may appear that certain
natural events, such as an earthquake, are still qualified as natural events that
can be used as an Act of God defense. This is indeed the case in Slater v. S.
Carolina Ry. Co., in which the court clearly upheld the defendant’s claim
bringing up an earthquake as a defense to escape liability.56
However, one might also argue here that similar to other natural
phenomena, not all types of earthquake should be accepted as an Act of God.

52

Id. at 17.
Id. at 16–17.
54
801 F. Supp. 337, 345–46 (D. Idaho 1992).
55
Id. at 346. This might simply mean that in assessing the level of foreseeability of an
event, one should look at possible future consequences of the event on the basis of modern life
(e.g., according to the development of science and technology), and then take these effects
into account in one’s decision.
56
6 S.E. 936 (S.C. 1888). It should, nevertheless, be noted here that the court also stated
that the defendant’s Act of God defense was accepted by the court because the defense was
not challenged by the plaintiff and its witness. Id. at 937.
53
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In this regard, only if it was extraordinary, unforeseeable, and unanticipated,
will an earthquake be qualified as a defense to escape liability.57
In addition, it is also important to bear in mind that the assessment of
whether an earthquake could be qualified as an Act of God will depend not
only on the exceptional character of the earthquake, but also on the ability of
existing science and technology to foresee, and hence, to inform the parties
to take the necessary anticipatory measures. In this regard, one may refer to
the ruling in Butts v. City of South Fulton, where the court defined a natural
disaster as a natural phenomenon “of such character that it could not have
been prevented or escaped from by any amount of foresight or prudence, or
by the aid of any appliances which the situation of the party might
reasonably require him to use.”58 The ruling indicates that courts will pay
attention to the question of whether those who invoke the defense have
previously applied appropriate measures, methods, or technology to prevent
the disaster or its possible impacts. Taking into account the rapid
development of science and technology, an earthquake might, to some
extent, still be reasonably considered foreseeable, anticipated, and
preventable. Accordingly, an earthquake should increasingly be more
difficult to meet the requirement to be qualified as a reason to escape liability
in the context of the Act of God defense.
For this reason, Flatt and Kliner argue “[g]iven the current state-of-the-art
knowledge of earthquake hazard assessment, in addition to the ability to
provide earthquake resistant structures at a relatively nominal increase in
cost, the Act of God defense should not be viable.”59 As such, current
scientific understanding is relatively able to predict the possibility of an
earthquake occurring in an active fault zone within a certain period of time
and are thus foreseeable.60 With advanced science and technology, it

57

Shea-S&M Ball v. Massman-Kiewit-Early, 606 F.2d 1245, 1249 (D.C. Cir. 1979);
Fairbury Brick, Co. v. Chicago R.I. & P. Ry. Co., 113 N.W. 535 (Neb. 1907).
58
565 S.W.2d 879, 882 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1977) (emphasis added).
59
William D. Flatt & Wesley R. Kliner, When the Earth Moves and Buildings Tumble, Who
Will Pay?—Tort Liability and Defenses for Earthquake Damage within the New Madrid Fault
Zone, 22 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 37 (1991).
60
In this regard, the authors argue,
[w]ith today’s advanced research and technology, however, scientists . . . are
better able to forecast an earthquake with an increasing degree of accuracy.
Furthermore, advanced seismic design . . . ensures better survivability.
Without the twin pillars of lack of predictability and lack of control, this
defense is certainly on the wane as applied to earthquakes.
Id. at 39.
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becomes more difficult to prove that an event is indeed unforeseeable and its
consequences are unanticipated and unpreventable.
3. The Act of God Should be the “Sole Cause” of Loss
Even when an event can be considered an Act of God, the party invoking
the defense still must prove that the Act of God is the sole cause of the loss.
In this regard, one is actually faced with the possibility of commingling
between natural disaster and human intervention. The requirement of the
sole cause is perhaps the most distinct characteristic of an Act of God
defense. U.S. courts have indeed shown a high degree of consistency in
insisting that the Act of God must be the sole cause of the loss.61
Although there is no single definition of what constitutes the “sole cause”
of an event, Fasoyiro notes that U.S. courts often require that the act be
“occasioned exclusively by violence of nature without the interference of any
human action.”62
In the case involving the negligence rule, the sole cause test will look at
the question of whether those invoking the Act of God defense are at fault.
Bozeman indicates that where negligence has contributed to the damage in
question, then the damage will not be considered as resulting from the Act of
God.63
For example, in Oklahoma Railway, Co. v Boyd, the court held that “[o]ne
is not liable for damage resulting solely from an ‘act of God’; but if his
negligence is a present contributing cause, which commingled with the ‘Act
of God,’ produces the injury, then he is liable notwithstanding the ‘act of
God.’ ”64 From this ruling, it appears that if a natural disaster is combined
61

Jill M. Fraley, Re-Examining Acts of God, 27 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 669, 675 (2010). It
should, however, be noted here that the author does not entirely agree with the requirement
that the Act of God is the sole cause of the loss, especially for cases related to climate change.
In this regard, the author finds that the requirement emerges from a classical legal fiction
imagining that human acts can be meaningfully separated from the acts of nature. According
to the author, this separation is no longer applicable when one is examining losses due to
climate change, as climate change itself cannot be considered an event free from human
intervention. Id. at 689–90.
62
Laurencia Fasoyiro, Invoking the Act of God Defense, 3 ENVTL. & ENERGY L. & POL’Y J.
1, 13 (2009).
63
Bozeman, supra note 40, at 427.
64
282 P. 157, 163 (Okla. 1929) (emphasis added); accord Ark. Valley Elec. Coop. Corp. v.
Davis, 800 S.W.2d 420, 423 (Ark. 1990); Beauton v. Conn. Light & Power Co., 3 A.2d 315,
318 (Conn. 1938); Fairmont Creamery Co. v. Thompson, 298 N.W. 551, 554 (Neb. 1941);
Dye v. Burdick, 553 S.W.2d 833, 839 (Ark. 1977); Oklahoma City v. Tarkington, 63 P.2d
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with negligence on the side of the defendant, the Act of God defense will be
rejected.
In some rulings, courts employed a wider interpretation of the phrase
“sole cause.” For instance, in Butts v. City of South Fulton, the court stated
that for an Act of God to be accepted, damages should result solely from
natural factors, without any human intervention or any influence from “the
power of man.”65 Similarly, in Curtis v. Dewey, the court held that “[t]he
distinguishing characteristic of an ‘Act of God’ is that it proceeds from the
force of nature alone, to the entire exclusion of human agency.”66
If the court finds the damage resulted from the commingling of a natural
disaster and human actions, either in the form of active participation, neglect,
or the failure to act, the natural disaster will be humanized, and the damage
will be attributed solely to human action. Accordingly, the Act of God
defense will be dismissed. Such a point of view can be found in the ruling of
Winchester Water Works Co. v. Holliday, in which the court explicitly
rejected the Act of God holding:
The principle embodied in all of the definitions is that the act
must be one occasioned exclusively by the violence of nature
and all human agency is to be excluded from creating or
entering into the cause of the mischief. When the effect, the
cause of which is to be considered, is found to be in part the
result of the participation of man, whether it be from active
intervention or neglect, or failure to act, the whole occurrence
is thereby humanized, as it were, and removed from the
operation of the rules applicable to the acts of God. Thus if a
party is in default for not performing a duty or not anticipating
a danger, or where his own negligence has contributed as the
proximate cause of the injury complained of, he cannot avoid
liability by claiming that it was caused by an act of God.67

689, 690–91 (Okla. 1936); Manila School Dis. v. Sanders, 289 S.W.2d 529, 532 (Ark. 1956);
Rix v. Alamogordo, 77 P.2d 765, 770 (N.M. 1938); Slater v. S.C. Ry. Co., 6 S.E. 936, 937
(S.C. 1888); Skandia Ins. Co. v. Star Shipped AS, 173 F. Supp. 2d 1228, 1241–42 (S.D. Ala.
2001); Freter v. Embassy Moving & Storage, Co., 145 A.2d 442, 444 (Md. 1958).
65
565 S.W.2d 879, 882 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1977).
66
475 P.2d 808, 810 (Idaho 1970) (emphasis added); accord Johnson v. Burley Irrigation
Dist., 304 P.2d 912, 916 (Idaho 1956).
67
45 S.W.2d 9, 11 (Ky. Ct. App. 1931 (emphasis added).
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Earlier, this Article asserted that a natural disaster qualifies as an Act of
God if it was unforeseeable and unanticipated. Failure to prove that a natural
event was unforeseeable and unanticipated will bar the Act of God defense,
mean that the defendant is negligent. In other words, when a future natural
event is considered foreseeable, and hence, can reasonably be anticipated, the
defendant bears responsibility to anticipate and to take necessary
preventative measures. If the defendant does not anticipate and take
preventative measures, he does not satisfy his duty of care, and he will be
liable. This is indicated in Justice Patterson’s dissenting opinion in Kimble v.
Mackintosh Hemphill, Co., in which he urged that all foreseeable dangers be
considered in determining whether an action is a negligent act. The Justice
stated:
It is a primary social duty of every person to take thought and
have a care lest his action result in injuries to others. This
social duty the law recognizes and enforces, and for any injury
resulting from any person’s lack of elementary forethought, the
law holds that person accountable. A normal human being is
held to foresee those injuries which are the consequences of his
acts of omission or commission which he, as a reasonable
human being, should have foreseen. . . . All foreseeable
dangers are to be considered in the solution of the problem
whether the creation of the situation was a negligent act.68
Indeed, the examination of the sole cause corresponds to the issue of
unforeseeability in the sense that once an Act of God and its impacts are
considered foreseeable, then there is a legal obligation to take due care to
prevent the act. This obligation necessitates an examination of the
defendant’s anticipatory actions and the Act of God’s actual consequences.
In this regard, as Binder has indicated, the inadequacy of design,
construction, inspection, and maintenance will result in the Act of God being
considered as the act of people.69

68
69

59 A.2d 68, 72 (Pa. 1948) (emphasis added).
Binder, supra note 50, at 19.
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4. The Act of God Defense Under Strict Liability?
One might wonder whether strict liability still allows the defendants to
invoke the Act of God defense. The Restatement (Second) of Torts in § 519
and § 520, which explain strict liability, provides no information on the use
of the Act of God defense.70 Similarly, the Restatement (Third) of Torts § 23
does not clarify the use of the Act of God defense for cases based on strict
liability.71 The absence of such an explanation does not necessarily mean
that the American Law Institute is of the opinion to rule out the Act of God
defense for strict liability. In fact, in its comment on the negligence rule, the
Institute states that the Act of God is an affirmative defense for the strict
liability rule announced in Rylands v. Fletcher.72 In addition, when
explaining the scope of liability, the Institute makes a reference to some
cases of strict liability in which the party was allowed to use the Act of God
defense.73
70

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 519–520 (1977).
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS : PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 23 (2010).
72
Id. § 3.
73
Id. § 34 cmt. d. In this regard, the American Law Institute refers to Smith v. Bd. of
County Rd. Comm’rs, 146 N.W.2d 702 (Mich. Ct. App. 1966), Clark-Aiken Co. v. CromwellWright Co., 323 N.E.2d 876 (Mass. 1975), and Trotter v. Callens, 546 P.2d 867 (N.M. Ct.
App. 1976).
In Smith v. Bd. of Cnty. Rd. Comm’r, the court defined an Act of God as “an intervening
or supervening force, which relieves from liability, is such a force of nature that it is so
calamitous, so violent and so out of line with the history of natural forces in the area as to
completely be unforeseeable by reasonable persons.” Further, the court held that Act of God
is a valid defense for cases involving strict liability, and it is a question to be determined by
the jury. 146 N.W.2d 702, 703–04.
In Clark-Aiken Co. v. Cromwell-Wright Co., the court followed previous rulings which
acknowledge that an Act of God is an exception for liability under strict liability. 323 N.E.2d
876, 877.
In Trotter v. Callens, the court even explicitly challenged the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 522, which states that “[o]ne carrying on an abnormally dangerous activity is subject
to strict liability for the resulting harm although it is caused by the unexpectable . . . operation
of a force of nature.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: CONTRIBUTING ACTIONS OF THIRD
PERSONS, ANIMALS & FORCES OF NATURE § 522 (1977). Indeed, one might find that according
to § 522, strict liability should not allow the use of the Act of God defense. The court in
Trotter v. Callens rejected such a conclusion and stated that the court “see[s] no sound reason
in logic or policy for not allowing this [Act of God] defense.” 546 P.2d 867, 869. Hence,
according to this court, an Act of God could be used as a reason to escape from strict liability.
The court further stated that “an Act of God applies only to such an extraordinary and
unexpected manifestation of the forces of nature as cannot be prevented by human care, skill
or foresight; that is, such a cause as would have produced the injury independent of the
defendants’ actions.” Id. at 869.
71
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One could also take a look at several federal environmental acts,
including the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA), the Oil
Pollution Act (OPA), and the Comprehensive Environmental Response
Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA), which all employ strict liability
as the rule.74 According to these acts, an Act of God is one among few valid
reasons that can be used to escape from liability.75 It has been argued that
precisely due to the presence of these defenses that it is called strict liability
and not absolute liability, which provides no defense for the injurers.76 One
court specifically stated that
[s]trict liability under CERCLA, however, is not absolute; there
are defenses for causation solely by an act of God, an act of
war, or acts or omissions of a third party other than an
employee or agent of the defendant or one whose act or
omission occurs in connection with a contractual relationship
with the defendant.77
In Liberian Poplar Transports Inc. v. United States, the plaintiff attempted to
get reimbursement under the FWPCA for amounts incurred to cleanup oil
that leaked from the plaintiff’s vessels.78 The plaintiff argued that the oil

74
It should be noted here that although these acts do not explicitly mention strict liability,
scholars agree that the liability rule used by these acts is strict liability. For comments on the
FWPCA, see for example: Paige Kohn, Oil and Water Do Not Mix: An Argument for the
United States Supreme Court’s Deferral to Congress in Exxon v. Baker, 38 CAP. U. L. REV.
229, 259 (2009–2010); Ryan Watson, Shifting the Costs to Those Best Able to Bear Them: An
Argument for the Adoption of Pure Economic Loss in the Event of an Oil Pipeline Spill in
Nebraska, 46 CREIGHTON L. REV. 115, 123 (2012). For comments on the OPA, see for
example: Robert Force, Martin Davies & Joshua S. Force, Deep Trouble: Legal Ramifications
of the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill Deepwater Horizon: Removal Costs, Civil Damages,
Crimes, Civil Penalties, and State Remedies in Oil Spill Cases, 85 TUL. L. REV. 889, 899
(2001). See also Kohn, supra, at 260–61; Watson, supra, at 124. For comments on
CERCLA, see for example: ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW,
SCIENCE, AND POLICY 449–50 (7th ed. 2013); William L. Medford & Mugdha Kelkar,
CERCLA vs. Code: Reconciling Conflicting Goals, 38 AM. BANKR. INST. L.J. 46, 46 (2011);
Lynda Oswald, Strict Liability of Individuals Under CERCLA: A Normative Analysis, 20 B.C.
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 579, 598–603 (1993).
75
33 U.S.C. §§ 311(f)(1)–(3), 1003(a)–(b), § 1321(f)(1), § 2703(a)–(b); 42 U.S.C.
§§ 107(b); § 9607(b).
76
Vernon Palmer, A General Theory of the Inner Structure of Strict Liability: Common
Law, Civil Law, and Comparative Law, 62 TUL. L. REV. 1303, 1329 (1988).
77
New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1042 (2d Cir. 1985).
78
26 Cl. Ct. 223, 224 (1992).
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spill was caused by an Act of God, namely a storm encountered by the
plaintiff’s vessels. The court held that the FWPCA imposes strict liability
upon the owner or operator of a vessel. However, the owner or operator can
be excluded from liability if he “can prove that one of the exceptions does
apply.”79 Hence, the plaintiff could escape from liability if the plaintiff was
able to establish the Act of God defense. In this case the court followed the
definition of an Act of God as given by the FWPCA, namely “an act
occasioned by an unanticipated grave natural disaster.”80 The court rejected
the plaintiff’s claim that the storm “was not well forecasted, and was not
visually foreseeable by the ship’s watch, that the storm was not
anticipated.”81 According to the court, the statute and the legislative history
of the FWPCA do not rely on a subjective test to determine whether a natural
event could be anticipated.82 In this regard, since there was in fact a forecast
before the storm hit the location, and there was also some indication of bad
weather issued an hour before the storm struck, the court opined that the
storm should have been anticipated.83 Accordingly, the court rejected the
plaintiff’s Act of God defense.84
In Apex Oil Co. v. United States, a company sought to assert the Act of
God defense to escape the strict liability standard under the OPA on the
grounds that a barge accident, which led to the spills of slurry oil into the
Mississippi River, was partly caused by an Act of God in the form of flood
conditions.85 The court followed the definition of Act of God as explained in
the OPA: “an unanticipated grave natural disaster or other natural
phenomenon of an exceptional, inevitable, and irresistible character the
effects of which could not have been prevented or avoided by the exercise of
due care or foresight.”86 In addition, the court found that the congressional
intent of the OPA indicates that the Act of God defense should be interpreted
more narrowly than the traditional Act of God defense, in the sense that the
interpretation should be more limited in scope.87 In order to explain what it
meant by more limited in scope, the court referred to the rulings in United
States v. English and Reliance Ins. Co. v. United States, which stated that the
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87

Id. at 225.
Id. at 226 (33 U.S.C. § 1321(a)(12)).
Id.
Id. at 225–26.
Id. at 226.
Id.
208 F. Supp. 2d 651 (E.D. La. 2002).
Id. (citing 33 U.S.C. § 2701(1)).
Id.
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defenses under the OPA “are narrowly construed, and only in the situation
where the discharge was totally beyond the control of the discharging vessel
would the responsible party be excused from liability.”88 The court rejected
the plaintiff’s claim about the presence of an Act of God, in part because the
court found that the plaintiff knowingly entered perilous river conditions
which were both anticipated and predicted. Despite being fully advised of
the conditions, the plaintiff operated barges with a tug, which had
insufficient power to face the increasingly powerful current of the
Mississippi River.89 The Act of God defense was also rejected because the
plaintiff failed to show that the Act of God was the sole cause of the
damage.90
Several CERCLA cases have also discussed the use of Act of God
defense to escape from liability. For example, in United States v. Barrier
Industries, Inc., the United States sued the owner of a hazardous waste site to
recover costs for cleanup of the site.91 The defendant resorted to the Act of
God defense by arguing that the spills of hazardous wastes were caused by a
bursting of pipes due to an “unprecedented cold spell.”92 The Barrier
Industries court rejected the defendant’s claim because the “unprecedented
cold spell” did not fall into the category of an Act of God defense under
CERCLA. The court referred to the definition of an Act of God set forth in
CERCLA as “an unanticipated natural disaster or other natural phenomenon
of an exceptional, inevitable, and irresistible character, the effects of which
could not have been prevented or avoided by the exercise of due care or
foresight.”93 The court also contended that this definition only allows an
exception for liability if the release or threatened release of hazardous
substances was “solely” caused by an Act of God. Because the accident

88
Id. at 654 (citing United States v. English, 2001 WL 940946 (D. Haw.); Reliance Ins. Co.
v. United States, 677 F.2d 844 (Ct. Cl. 1982)). In Reliance Ins. Co. v. United States, the Court
further stated that “only where the owner’s or operator’s conduct was so indirect and
insubstantial as to displace him as a causative element of the discharge would he be relieved
of responsibility and, correspondingly, financial liability.” 677 F.2d 844, 849 (Ct. Cl. 1982).
With this statement, it could be argued that the court in Reliance Ins. Co. v. United States has
narrowed the interpretation of the Act of God defense by emphasizing the element of “the sole
cause.” In this regard, an Act of God will be considered a valid defense when the court finds
that the act of man is so indirect and insubstantial to be regarded the cause of the damage. Id.
89
See Apex Oil Co., 208 F. Supp. 2d at 656–57.
90
Id. at 658–59.
91
991 F. Supp. 678, 679 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
92
Id.
93
Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9601(1)).
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involved some human contribution, the Court dismissed the Act of God
defense.94
In United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., the defendant, an aluminum
manufacturer, dumped oily wastes into a borehole that led to the Butler
Tunnel site, a network of underground mines and related tunnels and
waterways bordering the Susquehanna River.95 The mine workings at the
site were drained through a tunnel that fed directly into the river.96 The U.S.
Government sued the defendant to recover response costs. The defendant,
however, argued that the oil emulsion had been commingled with other oily
wastes containing hazardous substances, which were discharged into the
Susquehanna River in the wake of Hurricane Gloria.97 Hence, the defendant
invoked the Act of God defense, by arguing that the release of hazardous
substances was caused by Hurricane Gloria. The court relied on the
definition of an Act of God set forth in CERCLA and stated that under this
defense no liability will be attributed to a person if that person can prove that
the release of hazardous substances and the resulting damage were solely
caused by an Act of God.98 The court first found no evidence indicating that
Hurricane Gloria was the sole cause of the release of hazardous substances.
Second, the court maintained that the impacts of Hurricane Gloria could
“have been prevented or avoided by the exercise of due care or foresight.”99
If the defendant would have exercised due care it would have prevented the
dumping of oily wastes into a borehole of mine workings. Finally, the court
followed the ruling in United States v. Stringfellow, which excluded heavy
rainfall from the category of the Act of God defense.100
As indicated above, the Act of God defense can be used as a reason to
escape liability under strict liability. However, one might argue that the test
for the Act of God defense under strict liability is quite different from the test
under the negligence rule. The difference is especially relevant with respect
to the test concerning the “sole cause” element of the defense. In this case, it
is generally accepted that under strict liability the absence of negligence will

94
95
96
97
98
99
100

Id. at 679–80.
892 F. Supp. 648, 651 (M.D. Pa. 1995).
Id. at 651.
Id. at 652.
Id. at 649 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)).
Id. at 658.
Id.; United States v. Stringefellow, 661 F. Supp. 1053, 1061 (C.D. Cal. 1987).
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not absolve the defendant of liability.101 This means that when one invokes
the Act of God defense under strict liability, one cannot use the reason that
one is not negligent. This is because, as Fasoyiro observes, the test for the
Act of God defense under strict liability is causation-based, and not faultbased.102
Similarly, Binder argues that since the issue of the foreseeability of the
risk is a question of a negligence analysis, then under strict liability the
analysis should focus on the question of whether the occurring damage falls
within the projected risk encompassed by the application of strict liability. If
the answer is positive, then the unforeseeable nature of the impact is
irrelevant.103
Another important point to note is the tendency to interpret the Act of
God defense rather narrowly. As indicated especially in Liberian Poplar
Transports, Inc. v. United States and Apex Oil Co. v. United States, courts
are inclined to disregard the polluters’ subjective point of view with respect
to the issue of foreseeability of harm.104 Insistence that the Act of God be the
sole cause also exemplifies the narrow interpretation courts often take. A
narrow interpretation of the Act of God defense expands the scope of
liability, making it more difficult for the injurers to escape from liability.
5. Causation, the Burden of Proof, and Apportionment
All selected cases in this Article seem to indicate a general agreement that
those who claim the presence of an Act of God must prove that the Act of
God in question was exceptional, unforeseeable, unanticipated, and the sole
cause of the incurred losses. The next, more important questions become
how the defense corresponds to the question of causation and how to
apportion damages relative to the contribution of negligence or one’s activity
to the damage incurred.
In the context of the Act of God defense, some courts required that a
natural disaster should not only be a proximate cause of a loss, but should
also be the sole cause. In Kennedy v. Union Electric Co. of Missouri, the
101

See, e.g., Apex Oil Co. v. United States, 208 F. Supp. 2d 651, 652 (E.D. La. 2002)
(stating that “[l]iability under the OPA and CERCLA is strict, and the absence of fault, or the
exercise of due care is not a defense” (internal citations omitted)).
102
Fasoyiro, supra note 62, at 17–18.
103
Binder, supra note 50, at 61–64.
104
Liberian Poplar Transp Inc. v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 223, 226 (1992); Apex Oil Co.,
208 F. Supp. 2d at 654.
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court established a link between an Act of God and causation, by saying that
“the act of God was not only a proximate cause but was the sole cause.”105
In other words, for a natural disaster to be successfully employed as in the
‘Act of God’ defense, the natural disaster should not only be a concurring or
contributing cause, but more importantly should also be the superseding
cause.106
Furthermore, the Utah Supreme Court in Charvoz v. Bonneville Irrigation
Dist. attempted to make a distinction between the terms “sole cause” and
“primary cause.”107 According to the Charvoz court, primary cause refers to
a plural condition, in which there are multiple causes; while sole cause refers
to a single condition, in which there is only one cause, no other cause.108
This is reaffirmed in United States v. West of England Ship Owner’s Mutual
Protection & Indemnity Ass’n, where the court interpreted the term “sole
cause” to mean: single, alone, and without an associate cause.109
It becomes clear, thus, that in order for a natural event to be accepted as a
defense to escape from liability, the event must be the sole cause of the
incurred losses. Consequently, whenever the court observes another cause in
the forms of negligence or human intervention, the Act of God defense is
very likely to be rejected. It seems, hence, that from a legal perspective,
there is a clear dividing line between a natural cause and human cause,
enabling an Act of God and human negligence or act to cancel each other
out. This is clearly found in the ruling of Sky Aviation Corp. v. Colt, where
the court was of the opinion that “[i]n order for the rule to apply, the ‘Act of
God’ must be the sole cause of the injury. There can be no combination of
an act of God and the fault of man as the presence of one excludes the
other.”110

105
216 S.W.2d 756, 762 (Mo. 1948) (emphasis added) (citation omitted); accord Ark. Valley
Elec. Coop. v. Davis, 800 S.W.2d 420, 423 (Ark. 1990); Apex Oil Co. v. United States, 208 F.
Supp. 2d 642, 658 (E.D. La. 2002); Dickman v. Truck Transport, Inc., 224 N.W.2d 459, 465
(Iowa 1974); Dye v. Burdick, 553 S.W.2d 833, 839 (Ark. 1977); Joseph Resnick, Co. v. Kaisha,
241 N.Y.S.2d 134, 136 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1963).
106
See Wolff v. Light, 156 N.W.2d 175, 180 (N.D. 1968) (holding that “[i]t must be more
than a mere concurrent and contributing cause; it must be a responsible cause or a superseding
cause, that is, one which has superseded that original act or been itself responsible for the
injury”); see also S. Pac. Co. v. City of L.A., 55 P.2d 847 (holding that a rainstorm of unusual
intensity does not supersede the original negligence as proximate cause of an injury).
107
235 P.2d 780, 782 (Utah 1951).
108
Id.
109
872 F.2d 1192, 1197 (5th Cir. 1989).
110
475 P.2d 301, 304 (Wyo. 1970) (emphasis added).

412

GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.

[Vol. 43:383

Although in several cases there are attempts to humanize an Act of God
whenever there is a comingling between an Act of God and a human act, by
which the tortfeasor will be held liable despite the Act of God, one may
nevertheless still argue for an apportionment of liability and compensation
according to the contribution of the human act or negligence to the incurred
losses. A question thus arises as to which party bears the burden of proof
with respect to the apportionment of liability. In several cases, the courts
held that the party who seeks for an Act of God bears the burden to show the
extent of his or her contribution to the incurred losses. In these cases,
apportionment is thus directly linked to human contribution to an accident.
If the party fails to prove his or her contribution to the damage, i.e., the
percentage of the negligence or actions to the incurred losses, the party will
be held liable for all consequences or losses.111 On this ground, Rundall
infers that courts are rather hesitant to apportion liability based on the
relative contribution of fault or human act to the incurred losses as compared
to the contribution of an Act of God.112 The courts’ point of view has thus
made it difficult for the tortfeasor to ask for an apportionment of liability.
Accordingly, one may argue that the courts are actually quite consistent with
the requirement that an Act of God should be the sole cause of the incurred
losses, by which the tortfeasor will be held liable for the whole incurred
losses whenever the courts find that the tortfeasor’s negligence or act
contributes to the emergence of the losses.
IV. NATURAL DISASTERS AND NUCLEAR ACCIDENTS
This section uses nuclear liability law as an example to show whether a
natural disaster can be used as a defense to exclude liability. A nuclear
accident may be caused by a combination of natural and man-made factors.
The Fukushima Accident, which happened in Japan in 2011, is an example
of this. The Great East Japan earthquake that shook the east coast of Japan
and the consequent tsunami were the direct triggers of the accident.
However, a detailed analysis shows that many man-made factors contributed
to the tragedy as well.113 The power plant, located on the east coast of Japan,
111
United States v. Alcan Alumunium Corp., 892 F. Supp. 648, 657 (M.D. Pa. 1995); see
also Rix v. Town of Alamogordo, 77 P.2d 765, 770 (N.M. 1938) (stating that appellant
assumed a heavy burden of showing that the defendant was not negligent and thus did not
contribute to cause the damage).
112
Rundall, supra note 33, at 761.
113
We will come back to the Fukushima accident below in Part V.B.
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is very vulnerable to tsunami risks, and raises questions about the operator’s
location decision. Moreover, the design of the power plant was not floodresistant; all the emergency battery and electricity facilities were located at
the turbining buildings, which were immediately flooded when the tsunami
arrived. Hence, the question arises whether the tsunami can be regarded as a
valid defense to protect the operator from liability. This, of course, is not
only a specific concern of Japan as nuclear accidents can be catastrophic and
can have a broad, transnational impact. As such, it is helpful to examine
international regimes dealing with nuclear accidents and the extent to which
they consider a natural disaster to be a defense for nuclear liability.
Many Western countries started to develop the nuclear industry to meet
their increasing energy needs since the 1950s. However, a few barriers to the
development existed, like the serious public concern about sufficient
protection against potential damage, and the hesitation of investors to step
into such a high risk industry.114 To guarantee a certain level of
compensation for potential victims, relieve the nuclear investors from the
potential heavy claims, and promote the peaceful use of nuclear energy, the
governments tried to establish domestic nuclear liability acts and
international conventions on nuclear liability.
This Article will first address the so-called first generation conventions
that emerged in the 1960s in subpart A and then look at some post-Chernobyl
developments in subpart B. The United States is not a member of the
international regime but developed its own nuclear liability and
compensation regime through the Price-Anderson Act of 1957.115 These
nuclear liability rules and how the Act of God defense is treated in the
United States will be examined in subpart C.
A. The First Generation Conventions
In the 1960s, two international compensation regimes were established
for nuclear damage: the Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) regime and the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) regime. The July 29, 1960 Convention on Third Party Liability in the

114
Julia A. Schwartz, International Nuclear Third Party Liability Law: The Response to
Chernobyl, in INT’L NUCLEAR LAW IN THE POST-CHERNOBYL PERIOD 37, 38–39 (2006).
115
Act to Amend the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (Price-Anderson Act), Pub. L. No. 85-256,
71 Stat. 576 (1957).
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Field of Nuclear Energy (Paris Convention)116 and the January 31, 1963
Convention Supplementary to the Paris Convention on Third Party Liability
in the Field of Nuclear Energy (Brussels Supplementary Convention) were
developed under the auspices of the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency
(NEA).117 The second regime, the May 21, 1963 Vienna Convention on
Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage (Vienna Convention), was developed
under the aegis of the IAEA.118 These two regimes are usually referred to as
the first generation of nuclear liability conventions.119
Since the Paris Convention and the Brussels Convention are established
under the auspices of the OECD and NEA, they are regionally confined to
Western Europe, Slovenia and Turkey. The Vienna Convention, under the
aegis of the IAEA is worldwide in scope. These two regimes have some
similar characteristics, such as strict liability, an exclusive channeling of
liability to nuclear operators, a limitation of the liability in amount and in
time, and compulsory financial security.120
In Western Europe, there is a long-established tradition of a presumption
of liability for hazards resulting from a dangerous activity. The nuclear
industry covered under the Paris Convention is obviously qualified as a
dangerous activity and there is a serious difficulty in proving negligence of
nuclear operators. Therefore, a system of absolute liability is established
under the Paris Convention.121 According to the Paris Convention, the
operator is liable for damage caused by a nuclear incident in a nuclear
installation or involving nuclear substances coming from such

116
Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy, July 29, 1960, 956
U.N.T.S. 251 [hereinafter Paris Convention].
117
Convention Supplementary to the Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field
of Nuclear Energy, Jan. 31, 1963, 1041 U.N.T.S. 358.
118
Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, May 21, 1963, 1063 U.N.T.S.
358 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
119
See Michael G. Faure & Tom Vanden Borre, Compensating Nuclear Damage: A
Comparative Economic Analysis of the U.S. and International Liability Schemes, 33 WM. &
MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 219, 229, 240 (2008).
120
For more detailed discussion of these legal doctrines in international nuclear liability
conventions, see Norbert Pelzer, Focus on the Future of Nuclear Liability Law, 17 ENERGY &
NAT. RES. L. 332, 334–341 (1999); Tom Vanden Borre, Nuclear Liability: An Anachronism in
EU Energy Policy?, in EUROPEAN ENERGY LAW REPORT, at VII, 184, 198 (Martha M.
Roggenkamp & Ulf Hammer eds., 2010).
121
Nuclear Energy Agency, Exposé des Motifs, Revised Text of the Exposé des Motifs of
the Paris Convention, approved by the OECD Council on the 16th November 1982, ¶ 14
[hereinafter Exposé des Motifs], available at https://www.oecd-nea.org/law/nlparis_motif.
html (last visited Oct. 8, 2014).
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installations.122 To prove the fault of nuclear operators it is no longer
necessary to establish liability. The liability established under the Paris
Convention is quite stringent and is referred to as absolute liability since
many classic exonerations, such as force majeure, Acts of God, or
intervening acts of third persons, under general tort law are no longer
applicable.123 The available exonerations are an act of armed conflict,
hostilities, civil war, and insurrection.124 Those disturbances are either of an
international or of a political nature, so that they are regarded as “the
responsibility of the nation.”125 The operator is not liable for damage caused
via a grave natural disaster of an exceptional character unless the legislation
of the contracting party in whose territory his nuclear installation is situated
provides to the contrary.126 This defense was considered justified by the
drafters since this type of disaster is catastrophic and completely
unforeseeable. Thus, it should fall into the responsibility of the nation as a
whole rather than within the scope of the operator’s individual liability.127
Similar stipulations about absolute liability and exonerations can also be
found under the Vienna Convention.128 However, under the Vienna
Convention, there is an additional possibility for the operator to be relieved
of his liability: a competent court can, according to the applicable law,
relieve the operator wholly or partly from his obligation if the operator can
prove that damage resulted from gross negligence or an act or omission of
the victims.129
The negotiations of the Vienna Convention show that the adoption of
grave natural disaster as an optional exoneration was not without debate.
During the International Conference on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage
(when the Vienna Convention was created), a few delegates, such as the
United States and Philippines, proposed to delete “a grave natural disaster of
an exceptional character” as a defense.130 Various delegates proposed doing
122

Paris Convention, supra note 116, art. III(a).
Exposé des Motifs, supra note 121, ¶ 48.
124
Paris Convention, supra note 116, art. IX.
125
Exposé des Motifs, supra note 121, ¶ 48.
126
Paris Convention, supra note 116, art. IX.
127
Exposé des Motifs, supra note 121, ¶ 48.
128
Vienna Convention, supra note 118, arts. I(1)(K), IV(1)(3).
129
Id. art. IV(2).
130
See International Atomic Energy Agency, Official Records of the International
Conference on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage (Apr. 29–May 19, 1963), at 247–48
[hereinafter IAEA Records], available at http://www.iaea.org/inis/collection/NCLCollectionS
tore/_Public/42/080/43080878.pdf.
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away with the exoneration of liability in the case of a natural disaster arguing
that the draft convention accepted absolute liability as a result of which
exonerations should be defined as narrowly as possible.131 Serious nuclear
damage was also considered to be most likely caused by natural disasters and
the more dangerous an undertaking was, the more the possibilities of
exoneration should be reduced.132 It was also stressed that the risks should
be borne by the party who created them and that the nuclear operator had
greater capacity to prevent the damage than the public.133
However, delegates from many countries held that the defense of natural
disaster should be retained and that the use of this defense should depend on
the installation states. Japan, like the United States, played an active role
during the negotiation procedure but, did not join the Vienna Convention in
the end. In the discussion concerning the article related to exonerations,
Japan argued that it is very vulnerable to natural disasters. However, those
risks were usually excluded from liability insurance policies. As a result,
holding nuclear operators liable in such cases would leave them uncovered
by financial security. Thus, Japan argued that whether grave natural
disasters could exonerate operators from liability should be subject to the law
of installation states.134 Additionally, it was agreed that natural disasters
were not man-made, but were of the same nature as wars in terms that the
operators are not in charge of them. Hence, it was argued that war and
natural disasters should be treated equally as exonerations.135 Moreover, it
was argued that to cover natural risks under insurance, if possible at all, is
very expensive and the states don’t want to overburden their nuclear
industry.136 After two days of debate, Japan’s proposal was accepted: act of
armed conflict, hostilities, and civil war or insurrection were adopted as
exonerations, and a grave natural disaster of an exceptional character was
kept only as a defense if the law of the installation state provides no
contradictory provisions.

131
132
133
134
135
136

Id. at 249.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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B. New Developments
The first generation of nuclear liability conventions have made an effort
to establish international and regional regimes for nuclear liability.
However, they have obvious limitations in terms of restricted geographical,
scope narrow definitions of nuclear damage, and insufficient amount of
available compensation.137 The Chernobyl accident in 1986 has triggered an
intensive discussion about those limitations and led to the later revision
process of the existing regimes.138 The so-called second generation of
nuclear liability conventions were established thereafter. Those conventions
consist of the Joint Protocol Relating to the Application of the Vienna
Convention and the Paris Convention (Joint Protocol),139 the Protocol to
Amend the 1963 Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage
(the Protocol to the Vienna Convention),140 the Convention on
Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage (CSC),141 the Protocol to
amend the Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear
Energy of 29 July 1960 (the Protocol to the Paris Convention)142 and the
Protocol to amend the Convention of 31 January 1963 supplementary to the
Convention of 29 July 1960 on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear
Energy (the Protocol to the Brussels Supplementary Convention).143
Under the regimes of both NEA and IAEA, a few important changes have
been made, especially the broadened scope of nuclear damage and the
137
See Borre, supra note 120, at VII, 184, 192; Roland Dussart Desart, The Reform of the
Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy and of the Brussels
Supplementary Convention: An Overview of the Main Features of the Modernisation of the Two
Conventions, in INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR LAW IN THE POST CHERNOBYL PERIOD 215–41 (2006).
138
JULIA SCHWARTZ, ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT
INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR THIRD PARTY LIABILITY LAW: THE RESPONSE TO CHERNOBYL 41–44
(2006), available at https://www.oecd-nea.org/law/chernobyl/SCHWARTZ.pdf.
139
Joint Protocol Relating to the Application of the Vienna Convention and the Paris
Convention, opened for signature Sept. 21, 1988.
140
Protocol to Amend the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage,
opened for signature Sept. 29, 1997 [hereinafter Protocol to the Vienna Convention].
141
Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage, opened for signature
Sept. 29, 1997.
142
Protocol to Amend the Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy
of 29 July 1960, as Amended by the Additional Protocol of 28 January 1964 and by the Protocol
of 16 November 1982, adopted Feb. 12, 2004 [hereinafter Protocol to the Paris Convention].
143
Protocol to Amend the Convention of 31 January 1963 Supplementary to the Paris
Convention of 29 July 1960 on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy, as
Amended by the Additional Protocol of 28 January 1964 and by the Protocol of 16 November
1982, adopted Feb. 12, 2004.

418

GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.

[Vol. 43:383

decreased amount of the limitation of liability. For example, under the
Protocol to the Paris Convention, in addition to personal injury and property
damage, parts of pure environmental damage are also compensable.144 The
scope of liability in time and in amount is also increased.145
As far as the defenses to nuclear liability are concerned, they are further
limited in the second generation of nuclear liability conventions: the natural
disasters are no longer an applicable defense. The only still available
defenses are that the nuclear incident is caused directly by armed conflict,
hostilities, civil war or insurrection.146 It is worth noting that terrorism
increasingly became a concern since the September 11, 2001 attacks on the
World Trade Center in 2001, also in the field of nuclear damage coverage.147
However, until now, terrorism per se was not a cause of exoneration under
IAEA or OECD regimes. Whether damage caused by terrorism can
exonerate the nuclear operators depends on whether such an act rises to the
level of “armed conflict, hostilities, civil war or insurrection.”148 There is
some discord with the wording of these exonerations: it is argued that both
“civil war” and “insurrection” can be included in the term “armed conflict”

144
In the Protocol to the Paris Convention, four new titles have been added to the concept of
“nuclear damage”: the economic loss arising from personal injury and property damage; the
costs of measures of reinstatement of the impaired environment; the loss of income deriving
from a direct economic interest in any use or enjoyment of the environment; and the costs of
preventive measures. Protocol to the Paris Convention, supra note 142, art. I. Similar
provisions can also be found in the Protocol to the Vienna Convention. Protocol to the Vienna
Convention, supra note 140, art. I(k).
145
Since the health impact of nuclear radiation may not manifest itself for decades, the
revised conventions also extend the statute of limitations for claims for personal injury and
death. Those kinds of claims need to be brought within thirty years from the date of the
accident. See Protocol to the Paris Convention, supra note 142, art. VIII(a)(i); Protocol to the
Vienna Convention, supra note 140, art. VI(1)(a)(i). The amount of liability and public funds
are also increased. See Protocol to the Paris Convention, supra note 142, art. VII(a)(b);
Protocol to the Brussels Complementary Convention art. III(b); Protocol to the Vienna
Convention, supra note 140, art. V(2).
146
Protocol to the Paris Convention, supra note 142, art. IX; Protocol to the Vienna
Convention, supra note 140, art. IV(3).
147
See Nathalie Horbach et al., Terrorism and Nuclear Damage Coverage, 20 J. ENERGY &
NAT. RES. L. 231, 231 (2002).
148
International Atomic Energy Agency, The 1997 Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for
Nuclear Damage and the 1997 Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear
Damage, Explanatory Texts, IAEA International Law Series No. 3, at 49 (2007) [hereinafter
Explanatory Texts], available at http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/Pub1279_
web.pdf (last visited Oct. 13, 2014).
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according to international humanitarian law. Besides, the word “hostilities”
is considered to be too ambiguous.149
The further limitation of the defenses is in line with the trend of providing
more protection to victims in the revisions of nuclear liability conventions.
Since, as Fukushima showed, nuclear facilities may not be able to resist
grave natural disasters, allowing such defenses may deprive the victims of
compensation.150 The explanatory text of the Protocol to Vienna Convention
clarifies the reasons for the abrogation of the national disaster defense. The
nuclear installations are supposed to be built and maintained to withstand
grave natural disasters, including even the ones of an exceptional
character.151
C. Nuclear Liability and Act of God Defense in the U.S.
As mentioned earlier, the United States is not a member of the
international conventions. Therefore, how nuclear liability is arranged and
whether Act of God is an available defense in the United States requires
examination of United States law separately from the international
conventions.
In the 1950s the United States started to move towards peaceful uses of
nuclear energy and to allow private participation in nuclear power.152 The
Atomic Energy Act of 1954 allowed for the first time private possession of
nuclear fuel.153 However, private investment lagged because of the
unpredictability of potential liability and the unwillingness of the private
insurance industry to provide sufficient coverage.154 Therefore, the PriceAnderson Act of 1957 (the PAA) was enacted to provide nuclear liability
rules and a system of financial responsibility.155 The PAA has a dualpurpose: “to protect the public and to encourage the development of the
149
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atomic energy industry.”156 The dual purpose can be seen in the provisions
about limitation of liability and financial protection provided by the
government.
To ease the concerns of investors, the PAA exempts the licensees and
contractors from unlimited liability.157 It adopts a limitation on aggregate
public liability for a single nuclear incident. The nuclear operators are asked
to seek primary financial protection up to a maximum amount available from
private sources ($60 million when the PAA was passed), including private
liability insurance and self-insurance.158 The operators were mandated to
further purchase $500 million from a government indemnification policy.159
The liability was then capped at $560 million.160 This structure creates an
economic channeling of liability.161 It required the nuclear operators to seek
financial protection and hence exposed the major burden of compensation to
the operators. The other parties who may contribute to the risks, such as
nuclear suppliers or designers can also be held liable. Therefore, a legal
channeling of liability as in the international regime does not exist under the
PAA.
An important shift happened in 1975 when the operators were asked to
bear the financial burden themselves instead of getting support via
government indemnity.162 Though the total amount of compensation was
kept the same as that in 1957, a new tier of compensation, the retrospective
premium, was introduced in place of the indemnity provided by the
government. All operators should pay the retrospective premiums in the case
of an incident in excess of the primary liability coverage up to the amount of
$5 million.163 The amount of primary financial protection and retrospective
premiums has been increased over the years. Now, the primary financial
protection was set as $375 million, and the retrospective premium for each
156
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operator from each incident should not exceed $121,255,000 per reactor per
accident plus 5% for legal expenses since September 10, 2013.164 Given the
current number of operating reactors, the maximum compensation for a
nuclear incident is up to $13.6 billion.
When the PAA was passed in 1957, it tried to keep tort law intact. At that
moment, suits for damages were brought under the state law where the
nuclear accident occurred.165 From 1957 until 1966 when the PAA was
renewed, there was no assurance that strict liability would be imposed in all
states.166 There were some jurisdictions which purported to reject the
doctrine of strict liability and a sizable number of others where the law
relative to strict liability was unsettled.167 Negligence rules were, however,
considered insufficient to provide protection for the public, given the
difficulties to prove the negligence.168 The short statute of limitation under
state law may also bar the victims from compensation as the damage may not
manifest itself until many years after the accident.169 Considering the
insufficiencies of the state law, Congress proposed to establish a federal rule
of strict liability for the claims under the PAA. The nuclear industry
opposed a federal strict liability rule believing that such a rule would inhibit
the development of nuclear power and make the public apprehensive.170
Such a federal rule was regarded as contradictory to the principle of keeping
interference with state law at a minimum.171 Therefore, it was rejected.172
Instead, in the 1966 PAA, the nuclear industry waived certain defenses when
the nuclear accident comprises an “extraordinary nuclear occurrence”
(ENO).173 The defenses included:
(i) any issue or defense as to conduct of the claimant or fault of
persons indemnified, (ii) any issue or defense as to charitable
or governmental immunity, and (iii) any issue or defense based
164
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on any statute of limitations if suit is instituted within three
years from the date on which the claimant first knew, or
reasonably could have known, of his injury or damage and the
cause thereof, but in no event more than twenty years after the
date of the nuclear incident. The waiver of any such issue or
defense shall be effective regardless of whether such issue or
defense may otherwise be deemed jurisdictional or relating to
an element in the cause of action.174
This provision also stipulates explicitly that certain defenses are not
excluded, such as “a defense based upon a failure to take reasonable steps to
mitigate damages” and “injury or damage to a claimant or to a claimant’s
property which is intentionally sustained by the claimant or which results
from a nuclear incident intentionally and wrongfully caused by the
claimant.”175 It is worth noting that Act of God is not included in the waivers
mentioned above. Therefore, claims may still be possible even if an Act of
God exists.176
The above analysis shows that the waivers only apply in case of an ENO.
Whether an accident comprises an ENO is determined by the NRC. To be
qualified as an ENO, a nuclear incident needs to satisfy the following
criteria: the discharge or dispersal constitutes a substantial amount of source,
special nuclear or byproduct material, or has caused substantial radiation
levels offsite; and there have in fact been or will probably be substantial
damages to persons offsite or property offsite.177 The NRC regulations give
detailed criteria in determining whether the above mentioned conditions
come due.178 The legislation restricts the waivers to ENOs for two reasons:
to avoid “nuisance” suits and to protect the public from the consequences of
catastrophic nuclear accidents.179 However, the substantial criteria are very
difficult to satisfy. Even the Three Mile Island accident was not classified as
an ENO.180 After the Three Mile Island accident, revision of the criteria of
174
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an ENO proposed to the NRC.181 The NRC also identified the difficulties in
determining an ENO,182 and published three proposed amendments to the
criteria in 1985 and solicited public comment on these amendments.183 Some
scholars even advised the NRC to abolish the threshold of an ENO to allow
better protection to victims.184 However, after the procedure of public
comments on the proposed amendments, the NRC decided that the current
criteria for determining an ENO were adequate and were consistent with the
intent of Congress, and thus should be sustained.185 Under this situation, the
majority of claims for nuclear damage may still not arise out of an ENO.186
Therefore the question left is which type of liability rules will apply when
an incident is not identified as an ENO. One federal district court held that
the PAA did not preempt state law in a “sub threshold” accident in Silkwood
v. Kerr-McGee Corp.187 Therefore, whether strict liability would apply and
which defenses were allowed was determined by the state law. Recall that
states varied in their attitudes toward strict liability in the 1960s.188
A shift happened in 1988. A sole and exclusive federal cause of action
for any property damage or personal injury from radiation exposure, the
Public Liability Action (PLA) was established in the 1988 Amendment
Act.189 The term “Public liability action” is defined broadly to contain “any
suit asserting public liability.” The Price-Anderson Act also defines the
related concepts “public liability” and “nuclear incident” broadly.190
Through those broad definitions, Congress preempted all state causes of
action. There are two types of PLA causes of action: the cause of action for
personal injury and that for property damage.191 As for the substantive rules
181
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in deciding the action, they “shall be derived from the law of the State in
which the nuclear incident involved occurs, unless such law is inconsistent
with the provisions of such section.”192
The waivers of defenses still apply in case of ENOs. Most waivers have
not changed, except the statute of limitations requirement.193 However,
important changes have happened for non-ENOs accidents. Before 1988,
claims from non-ENO accidents were filed as state law causes of action in
state or federal courts.194 However, “[a]fter the Amendments Act, no state
cause of action based upon public liability exists. A claim growing out of
any nuclear incident is compensable under the terms of the Amendments Act
or it is not compensable at all.”195 As mentioned earlier, the federal courts
can only derive decision rules from state law that are consistent with existing
federal law.196 The federal law should be explained broadly as the “entire
federal statutory scheme on nuclear power.” The Amendments Act is simply
the last addition to the federal law of nuclear energy that has been evolving
since 1946 when Congress enacted the “Atomic Energy Act.”197 The PAA
waived some defenses of fault in case of ENO.198 Some scholars deduced
from it that the default situation of non-ENOs should allow the defense of
not being at fault.199 In other words, the PLA cause of action in case of nonENO accidents should be a negligence case and a breach of a standard of
care should be established.200 In many cases, the courts imposed a standard
of care based on federal regulations governing permissible doses.201
Nevertheless, there were some cases where compensation was awarded
even though the nuclear operator was in compliance with federal regulatory
standards.202 In Cook v. Rockwell International Corp., plaintiffs brought a
nuisance and trespass action under Colorado law and sought compensatory
and punitive damages.203 The District of Colorado awarded damages even
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when the exposed dose remained far below the regulatory requirement.204
Following Cook, the Western District of Washington applied strict liability in
a non-ENO accident in In re Hanford Nuclear Reserving Litigation.205
Those judgments were criticized by Jose and Garza for applying a wrong
cause of action.206 Though Cook was not overruled, other counts have
disagreed with its application. For example, in Koller v. Pinnacle West
Capital Corp., the court held that Cook failed to consider the preemption of a
state law standard of care in light of the newly introduced federal PLA.207 It
further concluded that “the standard of care in a negligence
claim . . . asserted under the Price-Anderson Amendments Act, must be
analyzed in the context of the federal regulatory safety standards.”208
Applying strict liability for non-ENO cases is regarded as inconsistent with
the Price-Anderson Act.209 Many courts have also declined to follow In re
Hanford.210 Therefore, whether strict liability is applicable to non-ENO
accidents, and whether breaching federal regulatory standards is necessary to
determine a reasonable care standard, remains unsettled.
As discussed earlier, substantive rules deciding nuclear liability cases can
still deviate from state law as long as they are consistent with the PAA.
Whether the Act of God defense plays a role in deciding nuclear liability has
not been discussed in case law. As discussed in Part III, there are many other
negligence and strict liability cases where the Act of God defense can be
made. In other words, the Act of God defense may apply in both negligence
and strict liability cases. The difference lies in the content of the applicable
tests, the “sole cause” element, and the foreseeability of the risk and impact.
D. Summary
The Fukushima accident showed that a serious nuclear incident can be
triggered by a natural disaster. That triggers the question of whether such
204
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natural disasters should limit or bar the liability of the nuclear operator.
Interestingly, this question was, as we showed, already heavily debated
during the meeting preceding the drafting of the Vienna Convention in the
spring of 1963.211 In the original version of the international convention, an
exoneration for damage caused via a grave natural disaster of an exceptional
character was introduced, with the option for signatory states to abolish this
exoneration.212 However, following the Chernobyl incident in 1986, the
nuclear conventions were revised, and as a result of which the exoneration
for natural disasters of an exceptional character was no longer available.213
However, as we will show below, this exoneration still exists in the nuclear
liability law of Japan, even though Japan is not a member to any of the
international nuclear liability conventions. When we look at the Act of God
defense in U.S. law, the picture is more complicated. The PAA waived
several defences of fault if the harm arose from an ENO, but the Act of God
is not among the waivers.214 Hence, applying Act of God defenses in case of
ENO is still possible. For harm from non-ENO accidents, the substantive
rules of state law can still apply.215 Whether the Act of God defense is
applicable in case of nuclear incidents has not been discussed in case law.
The discussion in Part III shows that the Act of God defense is often allowed
if the requirements of graveness, unforeseeability, and the Act of God being
the sole cause are satisfied.
Some reasons for rejecting nuclear disasters as grounds for exoneration of
nuclear liability, as presented during the diplomatic debates in 1963, are
economic.216 One argument is that the nuclear operator should be held liable
when the damage caused by a natural disaster is foreseeable. The risk of
natural disasters such as flooding or earthquakes should be important in
determining the location of the nuclear operator as well as in decisions
concerning the optimal design. Exposing nuclear operators to liability, even
when the nuclear incident was triggered by a natural disaster is therefore
certainly in line with the economic principles we have sketched above in Part
II. Liability in this particular case can still positively affect the operators’
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decision making process and therefore make sense from an economic
perspective.
V. CASES
The extent to which a natural disaster creates a following incident beyond
the operator’s scope of control will often depend upon the factual situation.
Therefore, we will now present two more detailed case studies. One is the
Fukushima case in Japan. We start, however, with an Indonesian case which
shows the difficulties in determining the man-made or natural character of a
disaster and the blurring boundaries between those two categories.
A. Lapindo Mudflow Case: A Critical Perspective
The mudflow occurred on May 29, 2006, when a mix of hot steam, water,
and mud erupted in the middle of a rice field in Sidoarjo, East Java,
Indonesia.217 This eruption occurred around 150 meters from an oil-drilling
well, operated under a joint venture between two Indonesian oil companies,
Lapindo Brantas and Medco, and an Australian company named Santos.218
Currently, more than 130,000 cubic meters of hot mud erupts each day,
creating a mudflow that inundates village after village forcing thousands to
leave the area.219 Even seven years later, the mudflow has no sign of
ceasing, and the number of victims keeps growing.220
Lapindo, the largest shareholder of the drilling operation, is accused of
triggering the mudflow, and Lapindo denies the relationship between the
mudflow and its drilling operation.221 However, a report from the Indonesian
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Supreme Audit Board showed several anomalies in the drilling operation,
like the inappropriateness of Lapindo’s drilling operation location,222 the
government’s lack of proper inspection to the drilling operation,223 and the
inexperience of the operator.224
Lapindo’s drilling operation was intended to search for gas reserves
located at the Kujung limestone formation at a depth of around 10,000 feet.
On March 8, 2006 Lapindo started to drill its BJP-1 drill well, and on May
27, 2006 the drilling operation reached 9,297 feet. On the same day, an
earthquake of a magnitude of 6.3 on the Richter Scale hit Yogyakarta, which
is around 280 kilometers southwest from Sidoarjo.225 It was reported that at
9,297 feet the drilling underwent total loss circulation, forcing the operator to
pull out the drill pipe and bit. It was during the process of pulling out the
drill pipe that on May 28, 2006, the phenomenon known as “kick” (an influx
of pore fluid into the well bore) occurred at 4,241 feet, causing the drill to get
stuck.226 The following day, a stream of volcanic mud started to erupt at
around 150 meters away from the drill-well. Because the mudflow
inundated the drilling area, the operator decided to abandon the well
temporarily on June 4, 2006, and permanently on August 1, 2006.227
From such a series of events, an important question arises about the
possible cause of the mudflow. The Supreme Audit Board observed three
different possible scenarios. The first one is that the mudflow was triggered
by the underground blowout, where fluids from two different zones influx
into the surface. The report shows that this view was also initially shared by
Lapindo.228 The second scenario is that the mudflow stems from a mud
Calamity: A Man-Made Mud Bath, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/
10/06/world/asia/06mud.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
222
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volcano that was triggered by Lapindo’s drilling activities. This scenario
would place blame on Lapindo’s drilling activities and Lapindo’s negligence
for not installing a steel casing for a part of the drill hole.229 Under the third
scenario, the mudflow is considered to have no relationship with the drilling
operation, since it was caused by a mud volcano as a result of the Yogyakarta
earthquake. If this were the case, the earthquake created a new underground
fraction that enabled the mud to flow to the surface.230
Under the first and second scenarios, the mudflow to a large extent
corresponds to Lapindo’s drilling operation, while the third scenario rejects
the connection between the drilling operation and the mudflow.231
Furthermore, it could also be assumed that under the first and second
scenarios, the mudflow would not have occurred without the drilling
operation, while under the third scenario, the mudlow would have occurred
even if the drilling operation did not exist.
The local residents have suffered most of the resulting losses including
over 3.2 trillion IDR (U.S. $296 million) in lost property. Economic losses,
in terms of property and income losses, were also incurred by private
companies (around 377 billion IDR; U.S. $34.8 million), several state-owned
companies (around 57 billion IDR; U.S. $5.27 million), and a local water
company (around 171 million IDR; U.S. $15,800). In addition, efforts to
stop and control the mudflow in 2007 cost almost 1.5 trillion IDR
(approximately U.S. $138.8 million). Total losses and expenses had reached
5.1 trillion IDR (more than U.S. $560 million) in 2007.232 These figures are
very likely to increase as a report by the Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan
Nasional (Bappenas), the National Development Planning Agency, projects
that by the year 2015 the mudflow could affect an area of 580 square
kilometers or 80% of Sidoarjo Regency, and result in total economic losses
of 16.4 trillion IDR (more than U.S. $1.8 billion).233
Since the begining of the eruption, Lapindo and its drilling operation have
been accused of causing the mudflow.234 Accordingly, the company was
the overpressure zone and the Kujung formation, influxed into the surface through the existing
fault. See id. at 33.
229
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asked to compensate for the damage resulting from the mudflow.
Understandably, Lapindo has dismissed the accusation, and consequently
claimed that any payment to the victims is only part of the company’s social
solidarity, not a legal duty.235 Lapindo also insists that the payment for the
victims take place under the framework of sale and purchase of property title,
not under any compensation scheme. Thus, it seems any compensation will
imply that Lapindo is liable for causing the mudflow.236
The mudflow has placed the Indonesian Government in a predicament.
Politically, the President is under pressure from victims and NGOs on one
side, and from Lapindo on the other side.237 The Government tries both to
help the victims of the mudflow and to avoid harming Lapindo.238
1. Court Ruling on the Mudflow Disaster
In 2007, a lawsuit was brought by Walhi, an Indonesian environmental
NGO, against the Indonesian Government and drilling companies, including
Lapindo. In this case, the plaintiff sought to hold defendants liable for
environmental damage resulting from the Sidoarjo Mudflow. The plaintiff
asked the defendants to stop the mudflow, as well as recover and rehabilitate
the affected areas.239 This section will discuss not only the ruling of Walhi v.
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Unstoppable Mudflow: Slimy Business, ECONOMIST, Nov. 29, 2007, at 58, available at http://
www.economist.com/node/10225951.
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Lapindo, but will also analyze and criticize the ruling by comparing the
doctrines of strict liability and the Act of God defense discussed in previous
sections.
a. Introduction to Walhi v. Lapindo
In Walhi v. Lapindo, the plaintiff claimed that the mudflow resulted from
negligence of the drilling companies. According to the plaintiff, the drilling
companies’ negligence can be seen in the form of the failures to implement
good practices in the drilling operation, to notice the sensitivity of the
drilling location, and to take precautionary measures although the drilling
operation was conducted in a highly populated area.240 In addition, the
plaintiff argued that the drilling activity was not supported by an
environmental impact assessment (EIA). In the plaintiff’s view, as a
consequence of the absence of the EIA document, there was no proper
anticipation of possible adverse impacts according to good engineering
practices.241 Furthermore, the plaintiff claimed that the drilling operation
was conducted without installment of a drill pipe casing. According to the
plaintiff, the absence of the drill pipe casing constituted a violation of a duty
of care according to the good practices in drilling operation.242 The plaintiff
also asked that the drilling companies be held liable on the ground of strict
liability. Strict liability refers to Article 35 of the 1997 EMA, while the
negligence rule refers to Article 34 of the EMA.243
240

Id. at 10.
Id.
242
Id. at 126.
243
Act of the Republic of Indonesia No. 23 of 1997 regarding Environmental Management
has been repealed by Law No. 32/2009 on Environmental Protection and Management. An
English copy can be found at http://faolex.fao.org/cgi-bin/faolex.exe?database=faolex&sea
rch_type=query&table=result&query=LEX-FAOC013056&format_name=@ERALL&lang=e
ng (“Article 34 (1) Every action which infringes the law in the form of environmental pollution and/or damage which gives rise to adverse impacts on other people or the environment,
obliges the party responsible for the business and/or activity concerned to pay compensation
and/or to carry out certain actions. Article 35 (1) The party responsible for a business and/or
activity which gives rise to a large impact on the environment, which uses hazardous and toxic
materials and/or produces hazardous and toxic waste, is strictly liable for losses which are
given rise to, with the obligation to pay compensation directly and immediately upon the
occurrence of environmental pollution and/or damage.”); Walhi v. Lapindo Brantas, Inc.,
383/Pdt/2008/PT.DK 8 (Jakarta Ct. App. 2008). It is unclear why the plaintiff used the two
liability rules simultaneously. Indeed, the way the plaintiff mixed the negligence rule with
strict liability has made its claim unnecessarily obscure. For instance, although the plaintiff
has used both the negligence rule and strict liability, the evidence and arguments provided by
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In response to these charges, Lapindo stated that strict liability could not
be applied in the case since the drilling operation it carried out did not use
hazardous substances or produce hazardous wastes.244 Lapindo’s argument
relied on Article 35 part one of the 1997 EMA which states that strict
liability is applicable to activities using hazardous substances, producing
hazardous wastes, and/or giving rise to major or significant impacts on the
environment.245 One may certainly argue that the drilling operation could
result in major or significant impacts on the environment, and hence, meet
the requirements set forth in the 1997 EMA. However, in Lapindo’s point of
view, for strict liability to be applicable, the requirements above should be
interpreted cumulatively such that the plaintiff should prove that Lapindo’s
drilling activity has, at the same time, used hazardous substances, produced
hazardous wastes, and caused serious damage to the environment.
Furthermore, Lapindo also denied it has carried out an unlawful act. In
this context, Lapindo argued that the absence of the EIA document does not
constitute an unlawful act since the drilling activity, which was still in the
exploration stage, was not an activity that requires the EIA documents.246 In
addition, Lapindo challenged the claim of unlawfulness by indicating that the
drilling activity has met all requirements, permits, and procedures.247
Through its expert witnesses, Lapindo argued that the absence of drill pipe
casing does not prove the company’s fault negligence.248 Importantly,
Lapindo’s expert witnesses argued that the mudflow occurred as a result of a
tectonic earthquake that hit Yogyakarta, around 300 km from the drilling
site, two days prior to the first mud eruption.249
The District Court of South Jakarta ruled in favor of the defendants on the
ground that the mudflow was caused by a natural phenomenon, i.e., the
Yogyakarta earthquake. Hence, all defendants were acquitted from liability.
The court further held that the government and Lapindo have a moral
the plaintiff only attempted to show the defendants’ negligence. It becomes even more
ambiguous when one looks at the statements of claim in which the plaintiff, despite the use of
strict liability, still asks the court to hold that the defendants have conducted an unlawful act
resulting in environmental damage in three districts in Sidoarjo. Id. at 21.
244
Walhi v. Lapindo Brantas, Inc., 383/Pdt/2008/PT.DK 47 (Jakarta Ct. App. 2008).
245
See generally id.
246
Id. at 45–46. Indeed, the exploration of oil and gas is excluded from the list of activities
that require an EIA according to the Regulation of the Minister of the Environment No. 11 of
2006.
247
Id. at 36.
248
Id. at 195.
249
Id. at 48, 153–63, 195.
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obligation to take measures to restore the damage, stop the mudflow, and
address social problems resulting from the mudflow. However, the court
implicitly took the position that the government and Lapindo had met their
moral obligations. In fact, the court considered the government’s and
Lapindo’s efforts to handle the mudflow to be sufficient.250
The plaintiffs then brought the case to the Jakarta Court of Appeals,
which upheld the lower court’s decision.251 The case did not advance past
the Court of Appeals because the plaintiffs failed to submit the case to the
Supreme Court.
The District Court of South Jakarta was of the opinion that both the
government and Lapindo have sufficiently addressed the mudflow and its
resulting damage. The court’s position might, to a large extent, be affected
by the court’s view that the mudflow is the result of a natural disaster. It is
in this context that the court’s decision on Walhi v. Lapindo merits further
discussions.
b. Court’s Ruling: Earthquake Triggered the Mudflow
Before reaching its conclusion, the court posed a question of “apakah
keluarnya semburan lumpur panas tersebut disebabkan oleh kesalahan
Tergugat I dalam pengeboran atau disebabkan oleh fenomena alam”
[translation: whether the mudflow was caused by the First Defendant’s, i.e.,
Lapindo, negligence in conducting its drilling operation or by a natural
phenomenon].252 To answer this question, the Court then turned to
testimonies of expert witnesses provided by both the plaintiff and defendants.
The only technical expert witness provided by the plaintiff stated that the
mudflow was largely caused by the missing drill pipe casing. The witness
also argued that drill pipe casing is an obligation for every drilling operation.
The casing functions as a safety precaution to prevent an accident during the
operation. Because the casing was not installed when the drilling reached
9,270 feet in depth, the drilling well could not sustain the high pressure as a
“kick” occurred. This series of events eventually led to the explosion of hot
250

Id. at 197. It is not quite clear what the court means by moral obligations. The court did
not explain why the government and Lapindo should bear similar moral obligations. Nor did
the court explain why measures already taken by the government and Lapindo already are
sufficient to meet such obligations.
251
See generally Walhi v. Lapindo Brantas, Inc., 383/Pdt/2008/PT.DK 29–30 (Jakarta Ct.
App. 2008).
252
Walhi v. Lapindo Brantas, Inc., 284/Pdt.G/2007/PN.Jak.Sel 193.
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muddy water causing the mudflow.253 The witness also argued the fact that
the muddy water has erupted a few hundred meters from the drilling well can
be explained by combining two factors. On one hand, the drilling well was
blocked by drilling equipment. On the other hand, there was an area of the
drilling well where the casing was not installed. In the witness’s view, the
combination of these two factors led to the mud eruption, because the
blocking of the drilling well has forced the water to find a way up through
the area where the drill casing was absent, finally reaching the surface and
bursting a few hundred meters from the well.254
However, this opinion was challenged by the defendant’s four technical
expert witnesses. The first expert argued that the area where the drilling took
place was prone to mud volcanoes. The expert also stated that the occurring
mud volcano has nothing to do with human activities, it is solely related to a
natural event. Hence, the expert witness also argued that the mudflow
cannot be stopped.255 The second expert argued that the mudflow was
triggered by ground motions as an extension of the Yogyakarta
earthquake.256 The third expert agreed that the mudflow was caused by a
mud volcano triggered by ground motions, which did not correspond to
Lapindo’s drilling operation.257 The fourth expert stated that according to
characteristics of the muddy water, the water comes from an area much
deeper than the depth that the drilling had reached. Hence, he argued that the
drilling was not the cause of the mudflow. The fourth expert also testified
that an uninstalled drill casing was a common practice, and hence, was not a
mistake. There were drilling wells in other regions that had no such a casing
installed without experiencing similar problems, despite the fact that those
wells were much deeper than the well in question.258
The experts provided by the defendant agreed that the mudflow was the
result of a mud volcano, formed by ground motions that were triggered by
the Yogyakarta earthquake taking place two days before the first mud
eruption. This conclusion was exactly the same as that held by the court.259
The court also argued that the opinion of one expert provided by the plaintiff
has been ruled out by the opinions of the four defense expert witnesses. The
253
254
255
256
257
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Id. at 155.
Id. at 157.
Id. at 158.
Id. at 160–61.
Id. at 196.
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court concluded that the mudflow was caused by a natural phenomenon, and
not by the defendants’ negligence.260
2. Critical Notes on the Court’s Ruling in Walhi v. Lapindo
As explained earlier, the court in Walhi v. Lapindo asked whether the
mudflow was caused by a natural phenomenon or by the fault of the
defendant in conducting its drilling operation. In concluding that the
mudflow was caused by a natural phenomenon, the court did not actually
focus on whether there was any negligence on the part of the defendants.
Therefore, the court’s conclusion is vulnerable to criticism.
First, the court seems to have mishandled the question of strict liability,
failing to consider whether strict liability was applicable to the case. Second,
in failing to consider whether the defendant had any fault, it seems that the
court decided that whenever there is an Act of God, the question of the
defendants’ fault is no longer relevant. This is unacceptable because there is
no basis to release the defendants from liability without considering their
contribution to the incurred losses.
The court also moved too fast in concluding that the mudflow was caused
by the Yogyakarta earthquake. Reading the court’s consideration, one might
get a strong impression that one of the reasons supporting its conclusion is
the fact that there was only one expert witness who attributed the mudflow to
the way in which Lapindo conducted its drilling operation, as compared to
four expert witnesses arguing that the mudflow was caused by a natural
phenomenon, i.e., the ground motions triggered by the Yogyakarta
earthquake.261 Therefore, it seems that the conclusion was supported by the
majority of scientists. However, this is not the case. Contrary to the court’s
conclusion, a majority of the world’s leading geologists, during a 2008
meeting in Cape Town, agreed on a shared belief that the mudflow was more
likely to have been triggered by Lapindo’s drilling than by the Yogyakarta
earthquake.262
Furthermore, it is important to compare the ruling in the Walhi v Lapindo
with some insights from the discussion on United States court rulings
concerning the Act of God defense. As explained earlier, U.S. courts usually
260
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See id.
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Oil Company Blamed for Mud-Volcano Eruption, 456 NATURE 14 (Nov. 6, 2008), available
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employ several criteria when examining the Act of God defense. Had the
Indonesian court asked for evidence similar to that required by the U.S.
courts, the result of the Walhi v. Lapindo case might have been significantly
different.
The discussions below show how the U.S. court requirements for the Act
of God defense would be applied to the Walhi v. Lapindo. In particular, the
discussions below attempt to answer whether the Yogyakarta earthquake, as
an event triggering the mud volcano that eventually leads to the Sidoarjo
mudflow, was: first, grave in character; second, unforeseeable, unanticipated,
and unpreventable; and third, the sole proximate cause, free from human
negligence or intervention.
In deciding whether the Act of God defense invoked by Lapindo is valid,
a court should first evaluate whether the Yogyakarta earthquake was a grave
natural disaster for the location of the Sidoarjo mudflow, as it occurred 300
kilometers away from Yogyakarta. Such a question means that one needs to
look into the magnitude of the earthquake, felt in the location of the
mudflow, in order to conclude if the earthquake was strong enough to trigger
the mudflow. In this context, one commentator states that the Yogyakarta
earthquake was in fact too small and too far away to trigger a mud volcano.
Specifically, based on data on earthquakes in the region, previous
earthquakes have been observed that were larger and much closer to the
location of the mudflow than the Yogyakarta earthquake. However, those
earthquakes did not trigger a mudflow.263 From this point of view, it might
be concluded the Yogyakarta could not have triggered a mud volcano in
Sidoarjo region as massive as the currently occurring mudflow.
However, one might argue that the distance from the epicenter of the
Yogyakarta earthquake and the location of the mudflow should not be an
issue, because, according to a leading scientist, an earthquake is still able to
trigger a mud volcano in a location thousands of kilometers away.264 In this
regard, what matters is whether the Yogyakarta earthquake created a seismic
energy that was capable of reactivating the already over-pressurized
263
Michael Manga, Did an Earthquake Trigger the May 2006 Eruption of the Lusi Mud
Volcano?, 88 EOS 201 (2007); see also Richard J. Davies et al., The East Java Mud Volcano
(2006 to Present): An Earthquake or Drilling Trigger?, 272 EARTH & PLANETARY SCI.
LETTERS 627, 629–30 (2008); Michael Manga, Maria Brumm & Maxwell L. Rudolph,
Earthquake Triggering of Mud Volcanoes, 26 MARINE & PETROLEUM GEOLOGY 1785, 1788
(2009).
264
A. Mazzini, Triggering and Dynamic Evolution of the LUSI Mud Volcano, Indonesia,
261 EARTH & PLANETARY SCI. LETTERS 375, 387 (2007).
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underground fractures in the pre-existing fault zone underneath the location
of the mudflow eruption, triggering the hot, muddy water eruption. Hence,
the issue is not about distance, but about the impacts of energy created by a
seismic activity.
To respond to this argument, one indeed needs to actually investigate and
predict how great the energy created by the Yogyakarta earthquake was, such
that it could trigger ground motions at the location of the mudflow eruption.
In this regard, researchers have investigated static and dynamic stress
changes caused by other earthquakes, by the Yogyakarta earthquake, and by
the drilling work at the site of the mudflow eruption.265 The researchers
observe that changes in pore pressure, due to changes in static and dynamic
stresses caused by the earthquake, were negligible to lead to a mud volcano.
In fact, tens of previous earthquakes, which had significantly larger ground
motions than the Yogyakarta earthquake, did not yield enough stress to cause
a mud volcano in the location of the present mudflow.266 A less technical
interpretation of these findings is that the dynamic stress changes created by
the Yogyakarta earthquake are similar to the stress changes generated from
the force of an adult footstep, whereas the static stress changes are even 500
times smaller. In comparison, Lapindo’s nearby drilling generated drill-pipe
pressures able to cause stress changes similar to the pressure generated by
about ten to twenty elephants.267 Thus, the drilling is more likely than the
earthquake to cause the mudflow. Consequently, it could be argued that, felt
at the mudflow location, the Yogyakarta earthquake was too small to be
considered a grave natural disaster.
Assume that all scientific opinions above were flawed. Accordingly, the
Yogyakarta earthquake could still be considered as capable of triggering a
mud volcano. If this was the case, Lapindo still has the burden to prove that
the mudflow, as a form of mud volcano, was unforeseeable, and the impacts
of it was unpreventable. In this regard, the next question that should have
265

According to the authors, earthquakes can expand or contract the Earth’s crust
permanently. These permanent stress changes, referred to as static stress changes, could cause
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waves generated by earthquakes create temporary stress, referred to as dynamic stress
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been addressed by the court is whether the mudflow, as a form of mud
volcano, should have been foreseen and anticipated.
Davies et al. consider that the Sidoarjo mudflow originated from an
undersurface blowout.268 This opinion is challenged by Sawolo et al., who
argue that even two months after the eruption the drilling bit was still in the
original position, suggesting that the muddy water has never flown up the
well,269 and more importantly, the drilling well and the casing shoe remained
intact after the mudflow eruption, indicating that there is no connection
between the drilling and the mudflow.270 In responding to this challenge,
Davies et al. argue the facts that the well was still intact and the drill bit was
still in its original position do not indicate that the blowout did not occur.
According to Davies et al., the re-entry of the well does not indicate that the
well remained intact. In addition, they also argue that the drill bit can remain
in its original position particularly in zones of highly swelling clays and if
the large volumes of cement have been pumped into the wells, such as in the
Lapindo’s drilling well case. Hence, according to Davies et al., the facts
submitted by Sawolo et al., do not prove that the mudflow was not caused by
an undersurface blowout.271
Davies et al.’s argument above will inevitably give rise to a serious legal
consequence because if the mudflow was indeed caused by blowouts, then
the Act of God defense will automatically be rejected. This is because a
blowout is considered a common phenomenon in drilling practices, which
leads to the responsibility of those engaged in the drilling operation to
foresee and anticipate. This is very clearly stated in Green v. General
Petroleum, in which the court rejected a defense arguing blowouts amounted
to an Act of God. There, the court held that since it is common knowledge
that “the inner earth contains powerful gaseous forces, frequently found in
proximity to and in connection with deposits of petroleum substances.”272
For this reason, the court contended that the blowouts did not constitute an
Act of God.273
Moreover, the fact that the area where Lapindo’s drilling operation is
located is prone to mud volcanism is admitted not only by the camp
268
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attributing the mudflow to Lapindo’s drilling,274 but also by those who argue
that the Sidoarjo mudflow is an earthquake-triggered mud volcano. Sawolo
et al., clearly state that the Sidoarjo mudflow “is a new mud volcano in a
region prone to mud volcanism. Along the vicinity of the Watukosek fault,
where LUSI is situated, there are at least five other known mud
volcanoes.”275 Similarly, even during the court hearing, an expert witness
submitted by Lapindo argued that mud volcano is a common phenomenon in
Sidoarjo region.276
The fact that mud volcanism is a common and known phenomenon in the
Lapindo’s drilling site should have had an impact on the court’s ruling.
Because the drilling was carried out in a location prone to mud volcanism,
the possibility of a mud volcano should have been foreseen and anticipated.
In this context, the court should have investigated whether the design and
operation of Lapindo’s drilling activities had foreseen and anticipated the
possibility of mud volcanism. The court should also have considered
whether Lapindo had taken appropriate measures to mitigate the occurring
mud volcano. Unfortunately, these two legal consequences were overlooked
in the court’s ruling. Lessons from the U.S. courts show that common and
known natural events, regardless of the magnitude, impose obligations on
parties who carry out an activity to foresee and anticipate the events, and to
take preventive measures accordingly. Failure to foresee, anticipate, and
prevent harm resulting from such common events means that the parties are
negligent and leads to the rejection of the Act of God defense.
However, if the court found that the mud volcano and the earthquake
were unforeseeable, Lapindo still actually has the burden to prove that the
mudflow was solely caused by the Yogyakarta earthquake. In this regard,
the last question that needs to be answered is whether the mudflow occurred
independently of human intervention, either in the forms of negligence or
human act, or in simpler words, whether the mudflow would still have
occurred even if Lapindo did not conduct its drilling operation.
As discussed earlier, the court in Walhi v. Lapindo overlooked the
question of whether there was human intervention in the case.277 The court
seems to be of the opinion that the presence of an Act of God could rule out
274
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any man-made contributions. Let us now examine the question of whether
there was human intervention in the mudflow case, either in the forms of
Lapindo’s negligence (in the case of the negligence rule) or Lapindo’s
drilling operation (in the case of strict liability).
One common reason to show Lapindo’s fault is the fact that there was an
area of open hole, where the drill casing was not installed into the well.
Rubiandini argues that the installment of drill casing is part of the standard
operating procedure within the drilling practice. He compares the casing
with the helmet for a motor rider, where both function as a safety procedure
to reduce risks.278
Another factor that might cause the mudflow is the way the drilling
operators have dealt with the blowout phenomenon. In this regard, Bachtiar,
as quoted by Cyranoski, stated that one of the possible causes of the
mudflow was that the drill was removed too quickly when the blowout was
happening, such that the pressure inside the well becomes uncontrollable.279
To some extent, Davies et al. agree with this opinion. They argue that the
absence of the casing was only a contributing factor for the mud volcano.
The main factor triggering the formation of mud volcano is the removal of
the drill bit and drill pipe on May 27, 2006, the days when the “kicks” were
occurring and where the hole was extremely unstable, which then caused an
influx of formation fluid and gas into the wellbore.280
In addition to these factors, Davies et al., also indicate two other critical
errors in the way the drilling was operated. Their errors are overestimating
the ability of the well to sustain pressure and the failure to identify the “kick”
more rapidly.281 Certainly, one could also add to these errors the possibility
that Lapindo has failed to foresee, anticipate, and take necessary preventive
measures against a common and known phenomenon of mud volcanism. All
of these factors should eventually lead to the conclusion that some
negligence on the side of the defendant was present in the mudflow case.
Even if one agrees with Mazzini et al.’s opinion that it is impossible to
determine the cause of the mudflow with certainty, one cannot, however,
entirely dismiss the presence of negligence in the drilling operation.
Consequently, if the court applied the U.S. court’s criterion that the Act of
278
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God should be free from the defendant’s negligence, the court would have
rejected the Act of God defense submitted by Lapindo.
Let us now consider whether the mudflow would still have occurred even
in the absence of Lapindo’s drilling. One way to answer this question is to
compare the impacts of the Yogyakarta earthquake and Lapindo’s drilling on
the location of the mudflow eruption. Recalling, Davies et al. comparison
mentioned earlier, it is clear that compared to the earthquake, the drilling has
created much larger and more powerful stress changes capable of increasing
pore pressure, which could eventually lead to the eruption. Again, the
studies of Manga and also Davies et al., show that previously tens and even
hundreds of earthquakes that were much larger and closer than the
Yogyakarta earthquake did not cause a mud volcano at the same location.282
Hence, if one considers that the conclusion solely attributing the mudflow
to the drilling is inconclusive, one cannot nevertheless completely rule out
the possibility that the drilling might have impacts on the mudflow. In this
regard, even Mazzini, a leading scientist arguing that the mudflow was
triggered by the Yogyakarta earthquake, still admits the possibility that the
drilling might have contributed to the mudflow.283
These facts give rise to two possible consequences to the rulings of Walhi
v. Lapindo. First, the court should have rejected the Act of God defense on
the ground that it is impossible to rule out the possibility of the drilling’s
contribution to the mudflow, and hence, it cannot be proven that the
Yogyakarta earthquake was the sole cause of the mudflow. Second, the
court could have found that there was a possibility of comingling between
the earthquake and the drilling, and could have held Lapindo liable for all
incurred losses due to its failure to make an apportionment regarding the
contribution of the earthquake and Lapindo’s contributing acts to the
incurred losses.
In addition, if the court consistently applied strict liability in Walhi v.
Lapindo, the court should have actually asked Lapindo to prove that the
occurring mudflow does not fall within the risk of conducting a drilling
operation, particularly in a mud volcano-prone area. Alternatively, Lapindo
should have actually been asked to show the impossibility of the mudflow
resulting from the conducted drilling operation.

282

See generally Manga, supra note 263; Davies et al., supra note 263.
Dennis Normille, Two Years On, a Mud Volcano Still Rages and Bewilders, 320 SCIENCE
1406 (2008).
283

442

GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.

[Vol. 43:383

None of these issues were addressed by the court, leaving one with no
other option than to conclude that the ruling on Walhi v. Lapindo is not only
weak, but also inconsistent with the doctrines of strict liability and the Act of
God defense.
B. Fukushima: Act of God?
1. The Factual Background
A 9.0 magnitude earthquake shook the east coast of Japan on March 11,
2011, which was followed by a destructive tsunami. This disaster lead to
catastrophic losses: it was reported that by the end of 2011 15,457 persons
died, 5,349 persons were injured, 7,676 persons were missing, and over
125,000 buildings were damaged or destroyed as a consequence of the
tsunami.284 Moreover, the tsunami led to a second catastrophe in Japan, the
core melt down in the Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant, which is located
near the east coast. The power plant is designed by General Electric (GE)
and maintained by the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO). Before
the earthquake, three of the six reactors in the Fukushima I Nuclear Power
Plant had been shut down for maintenance. Shortly after the earthquake, the
other three reactors were shut down automatically. However, even after the
shutting down of the nuclear reactors, a cooling system still had to be in
operation to absorb the decay heat from the radioactive decay of the unstable
isotopes.285 Cooling pumps can be either powered by on site units or offsite
units, such as grid and diesel generators. In the case of the Fukushima I
Power Plant, all the emergency electricity generators were located in the
basement of the Turbine Building at the moment of the earthquake. The
seawall of the power plant was designed to protect the plant from a 5.7 meter
flood. However, unfortunately, a 13 meter maximum height tsunami
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See Jay Friess & Andy Marso, What If It Happened Here? Evacuation Zones Outlined in
Case of Emergency at Calvert Cliffs, SOMDNEWS, http://www.somdnews.com/stories/032320
11/rectop133917_32384.shtml (last visited Oct. 13, 2014).
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followed the earthquake and arrived at Fukushima.286 This led to flooding in
the turbining building, including the power units, and further causing the
failure of the cooling system. This was followed by a series of accidents,
including full meltdown in three reactors, hydrogen explosions and leaking
of cooling water.287 This serious accident was later rated as International
Nuclear Event Scale 7, parallel with only the Chernobyl Accident in the
history of nuclear industry.288
This nuclear accident is a typical example that is caused by a combination
of natural disaster and human contribution. It is directly triggered by the
tsunami following the catastrophic earthquake.
However, a careful
examination shows that human factors are involved as well. For example,
the design of placing emergency electricity generators in the basement of the
turbine building makes them very vulnerable to flooding risk. It was
reported that the designer, GE, was aware of such risk since 1970s.289
However, both GE and TEPCO did nothing to reduce such risk since then.
Moreover, there is even criticism claiming TEPCO choose to locate their
power plant in such a vulnerable place on purpose to externalize the potential
costs created by an accident.290 Under this situation, the question arises
whether a natural disaster can be used as a defense to exonerate the nuclear
operator from liability. This question can only be answered after an
examination of the nuclear liability legislation in Japan.
2. Legal Framework of Nuclear Liability in Japan
Japan is a country relying heavily on nuclear energy: it is reported that the
generating capacity of nuclear power plants composed approximately 20% of

286
Pillip Lipsy et al., The Fukushima Disaster and Japan’s Nuclear Plant Vulnerability in
Comparative Perspective, ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 6083 (2013), available at http://www.stanfor
d.edu/~plipscy/LipscyKushidaIncertiEST2013.pdf (last visited Oct. 13, 2014).
287
See Japan ‘Unprepared’ for Fukushima Nuclear Disaster, BBC NEWS (June 7, 2011),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/mobile/worldasiapacific13678627.
288
The IAEA introduced International Nuclear Event Scale (INES) system in 1990 to
classify the significance of nuclear and radiological events. According to INES, events are
divided into seven levels, with ten times difference in severity between each adjacent scale
levels. See Factsheets & FAQs, INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, http://www.iaea.
org/Publications/Factsheets/English/ines.pdf (last visited Oct. 13, 2014).
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Norihiko Shirouzu & Chester Dawson, Design Flaw Fueled Nuclear Disaster, WALL ST.
J., http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304887904576395580035481822.html.
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See J. Mark Ramseyer, Why Power Companies Build Nuclear Reactors on Fault Lines:
The Case of Japan, 13 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L. 457 (2012).
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the total power generation capacity of Japan as of 2009.291 However, Japan
is not a party to any of the above mentioned nuclear liability conventions.
This might be because Japan has no land-border with other countries with
nuclear power. Hence, Japan’s need to handle cross-border damage is not as
marked as e.g., in Europe. Besides, other nearby Asian countries with
nuclear power, such as China and South Korea did not join the international
conventions either.292 Four instruments largely compose the Japanese
nuclear liability legislation: the Act on Compensation for Nuclear Damage
(Act on Compensation), the Order for the Execution of the Act on
Compensation for Nuclear Damage (Order on Compensation), the Act on
Indemnity Agreement for Compensation of Nuclear Damage (Act on
Indemnity) and the Order for the Execution of the Act on Indemnity
Agreement for Compensation of Nuclear Damage (Order on Indemnity).293
This section briefly sketches the principles under the legislation.
Japanese nuclear liability legislation has a few similar characteristics as
those of the international conventions. For example, a channeled strict
liability and compulsory financial security are also adopted in the Japanese
system. Section 3 of the Act on Compensation is titled “Liability without
fault, channeling of liability” and reads:
Where nuclear damage is caused as a result of reactor operation
etc. during such operation, the nuclear operator who is engaged
in the reactor operation etc. on this occasion shall be liable for
the damage, except in the case where the damage is caused by a
grave natural disaster of an exceptional character or by an
insurrection.294
This section holds the nuclear operator liable for damage, and fault is not
a requirement to establish liability. The channeling of liability is further
291

See JAPAN NUCLEAR ENERGY SAFETY ORG., CURRENT STATUS OF NUCLEAR FACILITIES
JAPAN 1 (2010), http://www.atom-library.jnes.go.jp/unkan/e-unkanhp1/e-unkanhp1-2010/
book1/ (last visited Jan. 10, 2014).
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clarified in Section 4, which requires no other person other than the nuclear
operator to be liable.295 Section 3 also stipulates the exonerations available
for nuclear operators: the damage caused by a grave natural disaster of an
exceptional character or by a serious social disturbance. This is in line with
the first generation of international nuclear liability conventions. The terms
used in the conventions are “act of armed conflict, hostility, civil war or
insurrection.” There is no significant difference between these words and the
In the second generation of
term “serious social disturbance.”296
international conventions, a grave natural disaster of an exceptional character
is precluded from the exonerations. However, this is still an available
defense in Japan.
The Japanese nuclear liability system is different from the international
system, with one difference being uncapped liability in Japan, as opposed to
capped liability in the international context.297 Hence, the liable party in
Japan has to pay the entire cost of danger it caused as long as it is solvent. In
spite of the unlimited liability, there is a ceiling for the financial security
required from nuclear operators. The Act on Compensation for Nuclear
Damage requires different levels of financial security from different types of
nuclear operators, varying from 4 billion yen (U.S. $40 million) to 120
billion yen (U.S. $1.15 billion).298 The operators can choose to use different
types of instruments to realize such financial obligation, such as liability
insurance, an indemnity agreement with the government, or a deposit
approved by the competent authority.299
Japanese nuclear operators, like their international counterparts, primarily
use liability insurance to provide financial security. Considering the
potential catastrophic nature of a nuclear accident, insurers often pool
together to provide insurance coverage. In Japan, the Japan Atomic Energy
Insurance Pool (JAEIP), which is comprised of forty-three insurance
companies, provides nuclear liability insurance. However, it is worth noting
295
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Rechtsprobleme der Reaktorkatastrofe von Fukushima I’, Zeitschrift für Japanisches Recht 31
J. JAPANESE L. 61, 70–71 (2011) [Liability for Nuclear Damages pursuant to Japanese Atomic
Law – Legal Problems Arising from the Fukushima I Nuclear Accident].
298
Act on Compensation for Nuclear Damage, supra note 293, § 7; Order for the Execution
of the Act on Compensation for Nuclear Damage, supra note 293, § 2.
299
Act on Compensation for Nuclear Damage, supra note 293, § 7.
296

446

GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.

[Vol. 43:383

that certain types of risks are excluded from insurance coverage, including
the damage caused by a grave natural disaster of an exceptional character or
by a serious social disturbance.300
The indemnity agreements provide nuclear operators with an opportunity
to provide financial security, when a certain risk is excluded by insurance
and other instruments. The market is reluctant to provide coverage for such
risks, like nuclear damage caused by natural disasters, damage happening ten
years after the accident and damage caused by normal operation since they
are regarded as unpredictable.301 As discussed earlier, only when a grave
natural disaster is classified as “of an exceptional character” can it be used to
exonerate the operator from liability. For damage caused by other natural
disasters, the operator is still liable. In this case, he can cover the risk
through an indemnity agreement. The operator has to pay an indemnity fee
as the price of coverage. The Cabinet Order shall decide the indemnity rate
according to the probability of damage and the government expenditures.302
The rate of indemnity is set as 3/10,000 or 1.5/10,000, depending on types of
facilities before the Fukushima accident. The government has the authority
to increase the rate if the amount available for indemnifying nuclear damage
under an indemnity agreement is insufficient to cover the amount laid down
by said agreement at the time of payment.303
A nuclear accident could be catastrophic, leading to losses well above the
required financial security and the operator’s own assets. In such a case,
many victims may be left undercompensated or even uncompensated. In
response to such situations, the enacted Act on Compensation gives the
government discretion to provide aid to operators.304 This Act also requires
the government to take measures to relieve victims and to prevent further
damage.305
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Liability insurance for nuclear installations, common clause, 2000 (Clause 2000), Article 7.
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3. Compensation for the Fukushima Accident in Practice
Regarding compensation for the Fukushima accident, the first question
that needs to be answered is whether the earthquake and tsunami can be used
as an exoneration to prevent the establishment of liability. Although the 9.0
magnitude earthquake is very significant and led to catastrophic losses, the
government was reluctant to admit that the disaster was “of an exceptional
character” and held TEPCO fully responsible for the damage it caused. This
is because the east coast of Japan is very vulnerable to earthquakes. Hence, a
significant earthquake is not unpredictable in such areas. Furthermore, some
argued that experts had warned that an earthquake might lead to a nuclear
accident at the Fukushima power plant, and TEPCO should have been aware
of such a risk.306
A Dispute Reconciliation Committee for Nuclear Damage Compensation
was established shortly after the accident to ascertain the scope of the
damage and to promote compensation.307 The Committee published several
guidelines on the scope of compensable damage,308 which broadly includes
personal damage, property damage, and even some pure economic losses.309
In addition to these types of individual damages, the Fukushima accident led
to environmental damage. To promote the decontamination from the
environmental damage, the Act on Special Measures concerning the
Handling of Environmental Pollution by Radioactive Materials Discharged
by NPS Associated with the Tohoku District-Off the Pacific Ocean
Earthquake that Occurred on March 11, 2011 (Act on Measures for
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Environmental Pollution) was adopted.310 The Act requires the national
government, local government, and TEPCO to work together to
decontaminate the polluted environment and dispose of nuclear waste.311
As discussed earlier, nuclear damage caused by natural disaster is not
covered by liability insurance. The government provides indemnification up
to 120 billion yen. After the accident, the insurance pool JAEIP refused to
renew the insurance contract in 2012 and continues to refuse, because the
Fukushima I power plant has not been restored to normal status and has been
categorized as creating consistent risks. After the government paid for
indemnification, the indemnity rate relating to nuclear reactors with thermal
outputting exceeding 10,000 was increased from 3/10,000 to 20/10,000.312
Though the exact amount for the total losses caused by the Fukushima
accident is currently unknown, it is estimated to be much higher than 120
billion yen (U.S. $1.15 billion). The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s Nuclear Energy Agency estimates that the
first-year compensation amount was 1.25 trillion yen (U.S. $10 billion) and
the compensation for the second year and beyond was 897.2 billion yen per
year.313 Compensating for the remaining losses is a challenge. Not
surprisingly, the government chose to intervene in response to this
catastrophe. Passed on August 3, 2011, the Act to Establish Nuclear Damage
Compensation Facilitation Corporation created a specific organization and
system of financing for compensation.314 The Compensation Facilitation
Corporation can provide compensatory support to operators in two forms: the
ordinary financial assistance approved by the management committee of the
Corporation and the special financial assistance approved by the competent
minister. A special business plan would have to be formulated in the latter
case. Under such a plan, the Corporation can get support from government
310
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312
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bonds or from financial institutions with the guarantee of the government.
Then, the Corporation can provide monetary support to the nuclear operator
for compensation, which needs to be paid back in the following years by the
supported operator in the form of special contributions. The other nuclear
power plant operators must to pay general contributions as well. Hence, a
mutual support system is established under the Act.315
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The starting point for this Article was the question of whether the ancient
paradigm that there can be no liability for an Act of God still holds. The
recent March 2011 Fukushima incident in Japan, along with many other
technological disasters, show that there are, in fact, blurring boundaries
between natural and man-made disasters. A natural phenomenon—like a
flood, earthquake or tsunami—turns into a disaster due to the intervention of
men.
The question we addressed in this Article: to what extent should a natural
disaster be considered an Act of God such that an operator is completely
excluded from liability when the subsequent technological accident takes
place. Using a simple economic model, we explained that this is, in fact, a
case of two contributing causes: a man-made cause (failure to intervene) and
a natural cause. Economic logic dictates that if the damage would not have
occurred but for the human intervention, the operator should be held liable
for the damage. Only when the operator merely partially contributed to the
loss (such as his failure to take adequate preventive measures) can there be
proportional liability (like in the case of causal uncertainty). Still, there
would be very few reasons to argue in favor of total exclusion of liability,
even if the incident was caused by a natural disaster.
The original nuclear liability conventions were relatively lenient toward
the operator, providing for exoneration if the nuclear accident was caused by
a grave natural disaster of an exceptional character. However, the legislation
of the contracting party could provide to the contrary. After the Chernobyl
disaster, the second generation nuclear conventions excluded this
exoneration.
Moreover, nuclear liability law in Japan, where this
exoneration still exists, requires a critical assessment as to whether the grave
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natural disaster was of an exceptional character. The Japanese government
rightly held that an earthquake, even a serious one, can hardly be considered
a grave natural disaster of an exceptional character, excluding liability of the
operator.
The economic logic of exposing operators to liability, even if a
technological accident was trigged by a natural disaster, is obvious: ex ante
knowledge of liability exposure efficiently incentivizes operators to consider
grave natural hazards and accordingly choose appropriate care, appropriate
activity levels, proper location, and proper design. The experience with the
Fukushima incident shows that this may be quite important.
Thus, there will be relatively little room for excluding the liability of
operators in the case of a natural disaster, which is also consistent with U.S.
case law. Only when the natural disaster is grave, unforeseeable, and
unprecedented and human intervention could not have prevented the loss
may there be exoneration from liability. However, with increasing
technological possibilities, it will be even harder for operators to argue that a
natural hazard was the sole cause of the loss. Of course, as the Indonesian
Lapindo Mudflow case shows, there may be uncertainty as to whether a
natural disaster (like an earthquake) or man-made action (such as the drilling
operation) caused the damage. However, the Lapindo case illustrates the
crucial importance of correctly allocating the burden of proof regarding
casual uncertainty, which is consistent with U.S. case law, by forcing the
operator to show that he took all measures to prevent the damage from
occurring, notwithstanding the natural hazard. Moreover, the presence of
causal uncertainty is not a reason to rule out liability of the operator
altogether; at best, liability ought to be proportional to the extent that the
operator’s activity contributed to the loss.
However, the histories of the Indonesian court case and the nuclear
liability conventions show that when high financial interests are at stake,
industry lobbying affecting court adjudication and formulation of liability
rules is a constant risk. Even if the international nuclear liability conventions
exclude the “grave natural hazard of an exceptional character” standard, the
construction of the liability regime in the international content is still far
from efficient. Features such as exclusive channeling of liability to the
operator, low limits in liability, and public funding awarding a large subsidy
to the nuclear industry are clearly not in line with the economic principles of
efficient accident law, and can only be explained as the results of efficient
lobbying by the particular industry involved.

